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Senior officers in the United States Army have a high
degree of confidence that National Training Center simulated
combat results are representative, under similar
circumstances, of actual combat. A validation methodology for
high resolution combat models, primarily based on data
acquired from the National Training Center, is the focus of
this thesis. The validation methodology, where appropriate,
translates confidence in National Training Center realism, to
confidence in the combat model. Theoretical issues, existing
methodologies, and the impact of model purpose are considered
in this research. The final product is a validation
methodology that makes use of a realistic representation of
combat, automatically updates validation criteria to account
for changes in weapons and tactics, and is responsive to the
purpose for which the model was designed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. WHAT IS VALIDATION
High resolution combat simulations are used across a
broad spectrum of military activities. One sees their use
and influence in the training of military forces, in the
development of weapon systems, in the analysis of operational
plans, in resource allocation planning, and in the
development of doctrine and tactics . However, this
widespread use is not without criticism and concern. The
basis of this concern is a question of confidence. What is
the appropriate level of confidence a decisionmaker should or
should not have in the results of a combat simulation? This
concern generalizes to include the question of relative
confidence between differing simulations. The question of
confidence is of extreme importance. Whether or not a combat
simulation will be used at all depends on the level of
confidence a decisionmaker has in it.
The issue of confidence begins with the type of problems
that simulation is used to address. Combat simulations are
generally used to address "squishy" problems because other
methods of analysis are inadequate. The "squishiness" of a
problem refers to how well it can be defined quantitatively;
the more "squishy", the less well defined [Ref.l, p. 43].
If the real world problem we choose to solve by means of
simulation were simple, and the solution set
straightforward, we would not waste our time modeling. It
is the complex, multidisciplined problems with convoluted
solution sets that we attempt to solve by modeling and
simulation. [Ref.2, p. 21]
Since defining the problem is difficult, interpretable, and
open to argument, the structure, processes, and results of
the simulation become questionable. Numerous questions are
generated. "Are the assumptions and transformations of the
model correct?", "Can we believe what the model is telling
us?", "Is the model useful?", "Why is this simulation better
or worse than another?", and "Is the simulation a good
representation of reality?". These types of questions were
summed up in 1968 by Dr. W. Fain, Chairman of the 1968
Warfare Model Verification Conference:
The question is, are the models good abstractions and do
they relate to the real world. [Ret. 3, p. 4]
This question, while well posed, still presents some
problems. What is "good" and what is the "real world"? Each
person may define these terms somewhat differently, and with
each differing definition there may be a different answer to
the same question. Little significant progress has been made
in addressing the decisionmaker's major concern of
confidence
.
Objective consideration of the question posed by Dr.
Fain, as well as consideration of "good" and "real world" as
they relate to simulation, falls within the realm of
validation. Validation concerns itself with changing the
trust one has in a model from a trust based on faith to a
trust based on objective analysis [Ref.4, p. 298]. Validation
is the process associated with this change.
B. PURPOSE AMD SCOPE OF THESIS
The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California
enjoys a strong reputation for representing combat in a very
realistic fashion. Moreover, senior officers in the United
States Army have a high degree of confidence that the results
from the National Training Center are representative of
results that would be achieved, under similar circumstances,
in actual combat. This confidence is the basis upon which
the results and lessons learned of the National Training
Center impact on policy decision made by these officers.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a validation
methodology that, where appropriate, translates confidence in
the National Training Center to confidence in the model under
investigation. The validation of high resolution combat
models against a standard source of comparative criteria
would have beneficial effects for the Army. It would provide
an objective alternative to advocacy as the primary source of
model validation within the Army. It would also provide a
method of standardizing the comparison of models. Finally, a
methodology based on a realistic representation of combat
would strengthen the Army's ability to cull out those model
that are inappropriate representations of combat.
The theoretical issues associated with the process of
validation are outlined and discussed in Chapter 2 . These
issues are extremely important because, far from having only
philosophical impacts, they also significantly affect the
practical matters of model validation. They bound one's
ability to conduct validation, but also provide direction by
highlighting the important issues that any validation
methodology must address.
In Chapter 3, consideration is given to the existing
methodological approaches. Naylor and Finger's multi-stage
approach is shown to be most comprehensive, but fails to
provide proper consideration to model purpose. The purposes
of high resolution combat models are discussed, as well as
their impact on the model validation process. Based on this
analysis, the multi-stage approach is modified to incorporate
model purpose into the methodology.
With a general methodology established, the requirement
for an acceptable reference system is addressed in Chapter 4
.
The reference system is the measure of reality against which
a model is judged during the validation process. Three
candidates, expert opinion, historical combat data, and
exercise/test data are analyzed with respect to their
individual advantages and disadvantages. This analysis
results in a "best" choice for use as a reference system in
the validation process.
An analysis of the National Training Center as a
reference system and the refinement of the general
methodology to make use of NTC data are the topics of the
final two chapters. The final product is a validation
methodology that makes use of the most realistic
representation of combat, automatically updates validation
criteria to account for changes in weapons and tactics, and




Validation of combat simulations, and models in general,
continues to cause much pause within the modeling community.
The problems associated with validation have not eased over
time. Even as the arsenal of data collection methods,
statistical techniques, and other tools, through which we
attack the validation problem, have grown, the continuous
desire for increased model detail has offset these gains.
Theoretical considerations are many and have been with us
since Aristotle's time.
One of the major underlying problems is one of
definition. As described in the introduction, the question
of "reality" comes immediately into play. Defining reality
establishes the standard against which the simulation is
compared. Without such a standard, validation cannot be
accomplished.
Besides the difficult task of defining reality, there are
three other significant theoretical issues.
"The Teleological Problem"—How a model by its nature
formulates an explicit cause-and-ef feet relationship that
excludes other proximate or remote causes
.
"The Epistemological Problem"--How the "truth" of any
model is always provisional and dubious.
"The Uncertainty Principle"--How the very act of
formulating or exercising a model distorts the reality we
seek to represent. [Ref 4, p. 303]
These four theoretical problem areas will significantly
impact any methodological approach to validation and
therefore deserve individual consideration.
A. DEFINING REALITY
The problem of defining reality has plagued philosophers
and scientists for centuries. The difficulty is that reality
is a fleeting essence, changing from minute to minute, and
argued by some to exist only as an idea in the minds of men.
In the context of validation and combat simulations, and from
a more practical viewpoint, the best one can hope for is a
reference system that will generate a consensus of use upon
which further considerations can be based.
The real {reference} system is nothing more than a source
of potentially acquirable data. At any point in time we
will have acquired only a finite subset of this data from
what is an infinite set or universe. In general, the real
system is (or will become) a source of behavioral data
consisting of time based trajectories of input, state and
output variables. [Ref.5, p. 574]
Many reference systems have been proposed. Each has its
strengths, its weaknesses, its advocates, and its enemies.
During the 1968 Center for Naval Analysis conference on the
topic of validation, actual combat was proposed as the
appropriate standard of reality. Combat data, while appealing
because of their source, exhibit significant weaknesses in
accuracy and completeness. These weaknesses are, of course,
reasonable considering combat has a purpose quite different
from that of providing data to beleaguered modelers
.
Other proposed reference systems include tests and
exercises, and the judgement of experts. Test and exercise
data, while offering significant gains in accuracy over
combat data, carry the burden of being measures of
abstractions of actual combat. Thus, even though the
accuracy of the measurement may have increased, the reference
system itself is now only a second order representation of
actual combat. Often the greatest insights can be gained
through critical examination by those who are knowledgeable
of and experienced with combat. Human nature, however, is a
stumbling block for effective use of "experts" in
establishing the standard for reality. Generalization from
personal experience is often hampered by the parochial
aspects of the experience, and by the perceptual biases of
the individual. Another fear associated with the use of
"experts" is that the "experts" are often the clients for
whom the simulation is being developed. [Ref 4, p. 302]
{ } authors addition
B. TELEOLOGICAL PROBLEM
Teleology refers to explaining events in terms of final
causes. Every model is a representation of a set of cause
and effect relationships. In the broadest sense, they are
the input-output transformations of the model, and in a more
micro sense they are the interrelationships established
within the model. The events of the world, including war and
combat, are part of a continuous, dynamic stream of
existence, interwoven into a fine fabric that details finer
and finer level of cause and effect relationships. The
teleological problem is that every model, of necessity, must
start the representation at a particular level within this
fabric of life. In making this choice of a starting point
certain cause and effect relationships are excluded from
representation. The level of choice is identified by the
assumptions and inputs upon which the model operates. The
teleological problem, as it relates to combat modeling, was
particularly well illustrated by Wayne Hughes.
Teleology is the study of final causes. A model always
asserts a certain cause and effect, even when it has
sophisticated feedback loops.... We presume a cause when we
write inputs.... The model not merely asserts presumed
first cause, but circumscribes for its user the world of
admissible causes.
Consider a warfare example: Why did Lee lose at
Gettysburg? Historians may take as proximate cause the
ill-conceived charge of Pickett on the third day. Or
possibly Meade's artillery, massed in the center.
As causes "once removed," there was Meade's astute
tactical leadership and Lee' s uncharacteristic tactical
error. But few historians stop there. The cause was
"really" J.E.B. Stuart's absence, so that Lee fought blind.
Or the earlier death of his stalwart Stonewall Jackson.
Deeper still, it was simply the inevitability that
sooner or later the odds would catch up with Lee, and his
daring battlefield tactics would overextend him. The
fundamental cause, therefore, was the union's greater
mobilization base. Lee was impelled by a sense of urgency,
knowing that time was against him. Thus, what historians
may call a tactical blunder was Lee's last-gasp gamble, a
gamble made with a thoroughgoing appreciation of the true
odds against breaking through the center.
None of the "causes" above is unimportant, and the list
is by no means exhaustive. One could add the Union
quartermasters' efficiency ("logistics dominate war"), the
motivating reasons why the soldiers fought tenaciously,
etc
.
All the "causes" contributed to the effect: the
Confederates lost the battle. Any model of it will
emphasize some things and deemphasize others, even to the
point of exclusion. Whether the model is the analyst's
simulation or the historian's description, it circumscribes
the event with some set of cause-and- effect relationships.
Any model, even the most ambitious, is vulnerable on
grounds of sufficiency -- its omission of the n-th order
"cause-of-a-cause-of-a-cause . . . . " [Ref.4, p. 304]
As Hughes points out, every model has a particular level
of circumspection, which establishes the teleological
limitations associated with the simulation. Attempts at
validation of the simulation, then, are bounded by the
limitations introduced through consideration of the
teleological problem.
C. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
Epistemology , the theory of knowledge, concerns the many
diverse issues associated with the human ability to "know".
The questions which it investigates are those such as the
character of knowledge itself and the relation between it
and belief; the validity and reliability of our claims to
knowledge of the external world through sense perception;
the propriety of claims of knowledge beyond the limits of
sense perception; our use of general concepts and of
general words; and the presuppositions required for our use
of memory and by our claims to recognize objects or kind of
object as being the same as what we have met before.
[Ref.6, p. 419]
Different subsets of these questions have been considered the
most important and have received the most attention at
various time in history. In the twentieth century
epistemology has "mainly concerned itself with questions of
knowability of the external world as accessible to empirical
observation for the verification of hypotheses. [Ref.6,
p. 249] Validation is strictly tied to epistemology in so
much as it is a process that leads to the acceptance or
rejection of certain claims based on "knowledge" of the real
system under consideration. In fact, every validation
methodology is based on one or more epistemological
approaches to gaining and evaluating "knowledge" of the real
world.
One example of an epistemological approach might be to
base knowledge on what one can sense and measure of the real
8
world. The claim might be that knowledge gained in this
fashion is obviously a true representation of reality. This
claim requires closer examination. How can one be sure that
one's senses and measuring instruments are providing an
accurate representation of reality? Looking at a stick in
water one might perceive it to be curved, but upon removing
it from the water it is straight. If one could not remove the
stick from the water, would it be straight or curved, and how
could one substantiate either claim of knowledge? When
looking for the truths of combat, how can one "know" when
truth is observed or when "fog of war" still clouds
perception? Shopehauer poses the problem in this fashion.
no knowledge of the sun but only of the eye that sees the
sun, and no knowledge of the land but only of the hand that
feels the earth [Ret. 7, p. 347]
Even from a more practical point of view, it is easily
seen that any knowledge gained in the manner is conditional
upon the accuracy of the method of measurement. While there
may be a true length associated with a particular rope the
bounds of human ability to access that truth may preclude
ever "knowing" it. Knowledge gained in this fashion is both
conditional and associated with a particular level of
uncertainty
.
The impact of this is that given an empirically well
defined reference system, and good agreement with the results
of a simulation, one still may not logically conclude that
the simulation is validated. Any claim of validation must be
caveated with the limitations of the empirical approach.
Other approaches exist, but all fall short of adequately
addressing the various issues associated with epistemology
.
However, from the many discourses on the many approaches, two
tenuous points of consensus fall out. The first is that human
knowledge, and the laws and theories based on that knowledge
are never complete. The second is that an unavoidable
characteristic of human knowledge is uncertainty.
Thus, within the realm of validation of combat
simulations the epistemological problem can be stated as two
questions :
1. Given a particular reference system (reality), what are
acceptable methods of claiming knowledge of the
system, how certain can one be about the knowledge





Given the lack of total knowledge of a system, and
uncertainty associated with the available knowledge, by
what standard or standards is the simulation compared to
the reference system.
Due to the close relationship of validation and
epistemology, approaches to validation deal primarily with
answering the two questions stated above. Different
methodological approaches for dealing with these two issues
and others are considered in the following chapter.
D. UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE
Formulated by Werner Heisenberg in 1927, the uncertainty
principle, while born to the science of physics, has had a
significant impact on a great many fields of intellectual
pursuit
.
It is to be emphasized that in observing a system it is
necessary to exchange energy and momentum with it. This
exchange alters the original properties of the system. The
resulting lack of precision with which these properties can
be measured is the crux of the uncertainty principle.
[Ref.6, p. 487]
Within the context of combat, application of the
uncertainty principle to human behavior is of much greater
consequence than its impact on the physical properties of the
data collected.
Consider an observer/data collector on the battlefield.
His presence and, more often than not, his purpose will be
known to the leaders involved in the engagements he is
observing. Even with the extreme pressure of life and death
at hand, human nature will exact a price. The presence of
the observer will affect the actions and decisions of the
participants of the battle. In each leader's mind will be
the hint that his decisions and actions will be chronicled
for later review and analysis. So there may be a little more
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bravado when concern is called for, a little softheartedness
when hard decisions need to be made, or a little less risk
taking than victory demands. Consider also the observer
himself and what actions he may take if he is facing the
possibility of death. Is it reasonable to expect the
observer not to pick up a rifle and fight when his life is
threatened?
Even if a human observer is not present, the act of
measuring combat may affect the process one is trying to
measure
.
as, for example, in World War II aerial bombing when some
crews refused to drop bombs in certain unfavorable
conditions after bomb cameras were installed in their
pianes because the combat film was used in a scoring system
associated with efforts to improve the modeling of bombing
accuracy [Ref.8, p. 309]
While this effect can never be countered in total, every
care must be taken to minimize changes to the reference
system that are caused by trying to measure it.
E. SUMMARY
Consideration of these theoretical issues begins to shed
light on the extreme difficulty of the validation process.
It can now clearly be seen that a formal "proof" of a
simulations replication of reality is an impossibility.
Analysis of these theoretical issues supports the position
that validation is something short of a "proof" and is not
inherently a question that can be answered simply yes or no.
While a "proof" is unavailable, these theoretical issues do
not preclude the establishment of a reasonable level of
confidence that the simulation adequately represents reality.
In fact, they provide direction as to what needs to be done
and limitations on what actually can be done.
The teleological problem and the uncertainty principle
place bounds on what can be done. The first sets a lower
bound on the claim to validation. Simulations represent
cause-and-ef fect relationships down to a specific level, and
validation of the simulation can only be claimed within the
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domain established by that bound. This bound should be
established prior to the initiation of any validation
attempt
.
The uncertainty principle precludes 100% validation, even
within the bounds established by teleological considerations.
As data is measured and collected on a particular reference
system, careful and diligent efforts should be made to
minimize the impact of these actions. The observed impacts
as well as expected impacts should be tracked and reported as
the validation process continues. The impact of changes of
human behavior because of observation/measurement may be
subsequently bounded through an a fortiori analysis.
These two issues are adequately addressed through tying
the scope of the validation effort to the scope of the model,
and through explicit treatment of the impact of measuring the
reference system.
The remaining two issues, defining reality and the
epistemological problem, require deeper consideration of the
practical aspects of validation. Each of these issues is
addressed in detail in the next two chapters, and their
consideration establishes the framework for the development






The philosophy of rationalism is based on the idea
that there exists some unquestionable truths "not themselves
open to empirical verification or general appeal to objective
experience." [Ref.9, p. 612] The term synthetic a priori was
coined by Immanuel Kant to describe these types of "truths .
"
In his book Urban Dynamics , Forrester' s urban model is based
on a rationalistic approach which he defends in this fashion.
Much of the behavior of systems rests on relationships and
interactions that are believed, and probably correctly so,
to be important but that for a long time will evade
quantitative measure. Unless we take our best estimates of
these relationships and include them in a system model, we
are in fact saying that they make no difference and can be
omitted. It is far more serious to omit a relationship
believed to be important than to include it at a low level
accuracy that fits the plausible range of uncertainty.
[Ref.10, p. 144]
The idea is to identify the unquestionable premises
and test the logical development of the model from those
premises. If the premises can be accepted and the logical
development proves sound, the model is considered valid.
The problem with validation under this approach is
that there is a significant difficulty in explicitly stating
all of the "unquestionable" premises. Even if this could be
achieved, rarely would a consensus on the "unquestionability"
of the stated premises be possible.
2 . Empiricism
This philosophy is diametrically opposed to that of
rationalism. Empiricists fault rationalism for not basing
model assumptions on empirical data, and lacking this, argue
that models based on rationalism are meaningless and not
representative of reality. Naylor and Finger present the
objections this way.
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Although the construction and analysis of a simulation
model, the validity of which has not been ascertained by
empirical observation, may prove to be of interest for
expository or pedagogical purposes (eg. to illustrate
particular simulation techniques) such a model contributes
nothing to the understanding of the system being simulated.
[Ref.ll, p.B-92]
Reichenbach goes even further, arguing that synthetic a
priori simply do not exist.
Scientific philosophy .... refuses to accept any knowledge
of the laws of the physical world as absolutely certain.
Neither the individual occurrences, nor the laws
controlling them can be stated with certainty. The
principles of logic and mathematics represent bhe only
domain in which certainty is attainable; but these
principles are analytic and empty. Certainty is
inseparable from emptiness; there is no synthetic a priori.
[Ref.12, p. 304]
Empiricism requires that validity be established by
testing assumptions on the basis of empirical data. While
the problem with validation under rationalism was one of
consensus, for empiricism it is primarily one of data. It is
often extremely hard, especially for combat, to gather data
that is acceptable for use in the empirical testing process.
3 . Positive Economics
An objection to both the previous approaches was
presented by Milton Friedman in his book Essays in Positive
Economics . He argued that testing model assumptions was the
wrong approach and that the true test of a model's validity
rests in its predictive ability.
The difficulty in the social sciences of getting new
evidence for this class of phenomena and of judging its
conformity with the implications of the hypothesis makes it
tempting to suppose that other, more readily available,
evidence is equally relevant to the validity of the
hypothesis-- to suppose that hypotheses have not only
"implications" but "assumptions" and that the conformity or
these "assumptions " to reality is a valid test of the
validity of the hypothesis different from or additional to
the test by implications. This widely held view is
fundamentally wrong and productive of much mischief.
[Ref.13, p. 445]
If the model consistently produces results that are
born out in the real world, how important is it that the
structures and processes underlying the model be congruent
with those of the real world? The approach of positive
economics considers these isomorphic requirements irrelevant.
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If the behavior of the simulation's dependent variables are
consistently and accurately predicted (at least better than
any other existing model), then positive economics classifies
the simulation as valid. After all, the "answer" is what the
simulation is all about.
There are two approaches to testing the predictive
ability of the simulation. The first deals with the ability
to reproduce historical outputs given the same inputs, and is
referred to as retrospective prediction. The second method
deals with forecasting future events based on a specific set
of inputs, and is referred to as prospective prediction.
Validation through prospective prediction is the stronger
test, however, this approach is not possible for combat
simulations
.
Critics of this approach, while agreeing that the
predictive ability of a simulation is important, contend that
it is in no way sufficient for validation of the simulation.
While predictive ability is appealing, it is not appealing to
falsify the structure and processes of reality, to whatever
extent necessary, to make the "answers come out right."
Furthermore, without an understanding of the structure and
processes of the system under investigation, how can one know
what real world changes will, at some unknown time,
invalidate the predictive ability of the simulation. These
problems are illustrated by a simple story.
There was a student doing fractions, and he wrote down
16/64-at least the teacher wrote it down -- and the student
cancelled out the sixes and got one quarter. And someone
else objected, and the teacher said: "what's wrong? He got
the right answer didn^t he?" [Ref.3, p. 54]
The teacher validated the mathematical model of the solution
process based on the student's results but the problems with
this approach are obvious.
15
4. Multi-Stage Validation
2Originally coined as "multi-stage verification"
,
Naylor and Finger proposed this approach in 1976 as a method
particularly well suited to validation of simular models.
This approach to verification is a three-stage procedure
incorporating the methodology of rationalism, empiricism,
and positive economics. Multi-stage verification implies
that each of the aforementioned methodological positions is
a necessary procedure for validating simulation experiments
but that neither of them is a sufficient procedure for the
problem of verification. [Ref.ll, B-95]
The first stage of this approach incorporates the
rationalist methodology, but weakens the conclusiveness of
tests applied. Naylor and Finger argue that the initial set
of hypotheses upon which the simulation is based are found
essentially through a search for Kant's "synthetic a priori"
Given a particular real world system to be simulated, there
are an infinite number of hypotheses that might be forwarded
to explain its structure and processes. It would be
impossible to empirically test each one as the method for
selecting the best subset upon which to base the simulation.
Only through the application of prior knowledge, past
research, existing theory, and general observation of and
familiarity with the real system, can this set of hypotheses
be initially chosen. Any hypothesis that is questionable
after careful scrutiny of this nature should be excluded from
inclusion in the set of fundamental hypotheses. This test of
"reasonableness" is an application of the rationalist
approach. This process is commonly referred to as
establishing face validity.
It is apparent, though, that experience with and
knowledge of a system changes overtime. Thus what seemed
reasonable one day may prove false the next, and conversely,
what was unacceptable may be shown sound. This indicates
that the test of reasonableness is temporal, and should be
2 The terms verification and validation have both been
used to describe the process of comparing a model to the real




applied again and again as significant changes in the level
of knowledge of the system occur. Naylor and Finger quote
Reichenbach in this regard.
Like the scientist, the scientific philosopher can do
nothing but look for his best posits. But that is what he
can do; and he is willing to do it with the perseverance,
the self-criticism, and the readiness for new attempts
which are indispensable for scientific work. If error is
corrected whenever it is recognized as such, the path of
error is the path of truth. [Ref.12, p. 326]
Naylor and Finger break from the rationalistic
approach at this point, rejecting the idea that these basic
hypotheses require no further attempt at validation; "we
merely submit these postulates as a tentative hypothesis
about the behavior of the system." [Ref.ll, p.B-96] This
initial set of hypotheses is then used as input for the
second stage of this validation approach.
The second stage incorporates the empiricist
approach, and examines the set of fundamental hypotheses
further. The hypotheses submitted from stage one are
subjected to statistical tests based on real world data.
Statistical theory, with respect to estimation and hypothesis
testing, provides the basis for this stage of the validation
process. Empirical testing, however, may not be possible.
There may be some hypotheses for which there is no real world
data available, or for which statistical tools are
inadequate. One has two choices concerning hypotheses of
this nature. The first is to simply reject the hypothesis,
but this approach carries the burden of continuing the search
for an acceptable hypothesis upon which to base the model.
The second choice is to continue with the hypothesis in a
"suspect" state. This is acceptable because there is no
explicit proof that the hypothesis is wrong, but requires
additional vigilance with regards to the impacts of this
hypothesis. While the first is the more conservative
approach, the costs associated with the reestablishment of
the fundamental hypotheses may be prohibitive.
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The third stage of this validation approach is to
examine the predictive ability of the simulation. With only
a narrow exception, Naylor and Finger argue that "the purpose
of a simulation experiment is to predict some aspect of
reality." [Ref.ll, p.B-96] Thus it is that this final
validation effort has a significant impact on convincing the
user that the model does what it is supposed to. This stage
of testing is done by comparing the input-output
transformations of the simulation with those observed in the
reference system. The methods by which this comparison may
be made are quite varied. There are highly technical
mathematical methods, such as spectral analysis, and
behavioral methods such as "turing tests".
Naylor and Finger's multi-stage approach has been
attacked on the grounds that it fails to give adequate
consideration to the purpose of the simulation. This
approach uses prediction as the only purpose of simulations,
and while possibly true at one time, this certainly is not
the case today. Simulations are used to instruct, evaluate
policy alternatives, and develop theory as well as to predict
output values. The multi-stage approach combines the
strengths of the three previous approaches well, but is
lacking in its explicit consideration of the possible impacts
of the purpose of the simulation.
5 . Absolute Pragmatist
This approach developed to a large extent in response
to the multi-stage approach's failure to consider model
purpose. It focuses on the simulation, much like positive
economics did, as a black box. While positive economics
viewed prediction as the only purpose of simulation, the
absolute pragmatist approach broadens the horizon of uses.
This approach argues that each simulation is developed for a
purpose and it is the ability to successfully accomplish that
purpose that establishes validity.
We propose that the criterion of usefulness of the model be
qu<
too weak to serve the intended purpose. [Ref.14, p.B-105]
The usefulness of a model has an easily arguable
place in the validation process. If the model does not serve
its purpose, it will not be used no matter how many other
validation tests it may have passed. Showing that a model
serves its intended purpose is the "bottom line" for
decisionmakers. If the decisionmaker has no confidence in
the model, it essentially does not exist.
Critics argue, as in the case of positive economics
that while this criteria is applicable, it is not sufficient
for validation. The question remains one of knowing the
provisional qualities of the model, and when, based on input
changes, the model is no longer valid.
B. IMPACT OF MODEL PURPOSE
Naylor and Finger present a comprehensive approach to
the process of validation with the exception of their failure
to address the implications of simulation purposes other than
prediction. This section addresses the primary uses of high
resolution combat simulations and the impact that these
different uses have on the validation process. The intent
is, in particular, to examine the effects of simulation
purpose on the validation process, and to determine whether
the multi stage approach is still appropriate with respect to
purposes other than prediction.
1 . Reproduction of a Real System
Reproduction of the real system is done to gain
insight into its operation, and to predict the behavior of
the system under particular conditions. As argued by Naylor
and Finger, this is the purpose of most simulations. In
cases where this is not the primary purpose, meeting
reproducibility criteria generally assures the simulation is
adequate for its primary purpose.
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The criteria for validation, in this case, is how
well the simulation replicates the selected reference system.
Limitations of resources, time (for development and for
running the simulation) , money, and data limit the accuracy
to which the modeler can replicate the real system. The
question is whether the simulation's level of isomorphism is
adequate to predict system behavior and provide
understanding of system behavior. The comparison, to gauge
this accuracy, is generally accomplished through empirical
testing
.
2 . Comparison of Courses of Action
This is a primary use of high resolution combat
simulations. Comparisons of courses of action are undertaken
to make decisions on weapon procurement, tactics, and
force/weapon mix strategies. The decisionmaker wants
information on the relative value of the alternatives
available to him. In this case the actual values of the
simulation are not as important as the accurate
representation of the relative differences between competing
alternatives. The simulation must provide a discernable
representation of these differences, and the accuracy of the
representation must be such that appropriate decisions can be
made. When the decisionmaker only needs to know which
decision is best, representation of the relative differences
also becomes unimportant, and proper ordering of the
alternatives is all that is needed.
The validity of the model is determined by its
ability to appropriately represent the real system to the
level required by the decision under consideration. While
this requirement is less rigorous than strict replication
criteria, reproducibility is still the dominant criteria. If
the simulation accurately replicates the real system, then
the relative values of outputs for different courses of
action will also be representative of the real system.
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3. Instruction
When the simulation is used to instruct or train, the
paramount consideration is that the model impart to the
student proper lessons about the real system under study. In
other words, the simulation must not teach the student
inappropriate responses, or provide the student with false
insights. Consider a simulation developed to teach a
lieutenant the proper method of employment of his platoon in
clearing a minefield. The simulation might represent losses
associated with this action as stochastic in nature. If the
probabilities are accurately developed from historical data,
the predicted outcomes may be very representative of the long
term losses associated with clearing minefields. However, if
the lieutenant learns that losses are a product of chance,
the model failed in its purpose. Training is conducted in
"snapshots", and if the "snapshot" does not reinforce the
proper lesson, it does more harm than good. Another outcome
of the stated situation might be that the stochasticly
produced losses associated with a poorer course of action may
be lower than losses associated with a superior method. This
disparity would correct itself in the long run, but the
lieutenant is learning from the "snapshot" of reality that
the simulation has produced. In this case the lieutenant may
have again learned the wrong lesson. When models are used
for instruction, the need seems to be for the model to
operate in a fashion that consistently provides outcomes that
reward application of currently approved doctrine and
tactics. For specific purposes ( teaching that attacking the
enemy flank is better than a frontal attack) certain model
parameters might be somewhat exaggerated to drive the lesson
home. The validity criteria for this type of simulation is
no longer strictly tied to replication of the real system.
the validity criteria have shifted from the observable
universe to the cognitive and affective systems of those
individuals whom the operating model is intended to
instruct. [Ref.15, p. 219]
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If a different simulation was developed for each
different lesson to be taught then manipulating parameters to
support these lessons would be appropriate. The costs
associated with this type of training approach would be
enormous, and therefore the requirement is for simulations
that can be used to teach the broad range of skills and
techniques associated with combat. Due to the extreme
interdependence of the processes and entities involved in
combat, adjusting one parameter to support a particular
lesson generally detracts from the ability to teach other
lessons. The need is for an appropriate middle ground, and
this middle ground is accurate replication of the real
system. While the lesson that the student learns is still of
the greatest importance, replication of the real system
supports the broadest range of lessons, and provides realism
as the student is learning.
4 . Examination of Non-existent Universes
A working prototype of a particular weapon system has
not yet been built, yet combat simulations are used to
examine the effects of its use in particular combat
scenarios. Tactical nuclear weapons have not been used
against US forces in Germany, yet simulations are used to
address this potential engagement. Simulations are used again
and again in the development of contingency plans for
scenarios that may never occur. Combat simulations used in
this way are examining "non-existent universes." Validation
of simulations with this purpose is extremely difficult. In
this case there exists no observable universe that offers
reference points by which one can check the veracity of the
assumptions associated with those yet to occur events.
Two types of future systems are examined by combat
simulations, those that are the result of revolution and
those that are the result of evolution. The first,
indicating a future state substantially different than the
present, occurs primarily when examining highly futuristic
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weapons or extreme catastrophic conditions. The time and
effort spent in this area is less, due to the lower
probability of occurrence, than investigation of the second
choice
.
Investigation of future states that are the result of
evolutionary variations of the present is even more dominant
when considering high resolution combat simulations. Future
states resulting from evolutionary change are those states
that are reached through incremental change in the structure
and processes of the present state. Considering that "the
most powerful determinant of what will happen tomorrow is
what is happening today" [Ref.16, p. 122], comparison to the
present state may provide some measure of the confidence that
should be associated with the simulation. This comparison is
reasonable because, in evolutionary development of future
states, the incremental change affects only a small
percentage of the existing present state hypotheses.
Even for evolutionary future states, the comparison
of the future to the present becomes untenable when either
one or both of two conditions exist. The first condition is
a large time gap between the present and the future state
under consideration. When the time difference is large, the
evolutionary chain between the present and this particular
future state becomes weaker and weaker. The longer away the
future state is, the greater the permutations of event paths
available for the future to have progressed along. The
second is if the evolutionary changes occur over a
significantly broad range of present day hypotheses. As the
number of changed present day hypotheses grows, the basis of
comparison between the present and the future once again
weakens . The greater the number of changes the weaker the
link between present and future. In fact, at some point the
changes may, in sum, cause the future state to be more
representative of revolutionary change than of evolutionary
change. In considering either of these two problem areas the
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establishment of what is too large a time gap and what is too
many changes is subjective and judgmental. The more
conservative the restrictions on time and change, the
stronger the comparison is as a method of establishing
confidence in the simulation.
In general, the criteria available for validation of
simulations of this nature are logical consistency and
reliability [Ref.15, p. 219]. When the domain of consideration
is limited to high resolution simulations and consequently to
evolutionary future states, comparison of the simulation
hypotheses and outcomes to the present state is an
appropriate method of approaching validation.
C. REVISED APPROACH
While the purposes described in the sections above are
not exhaustive, they represent the majority of uses of high
resolution combat simulations. In each case model purpose
has affected the criteria of the validation process.
Referring back to the original question, "are models good
abstractions and do they relate to the real world, " the
impact of model purpose is on how the model relates to the
real world. What relation is represented and to what extent
is the relation represented are the considerations governed
by the model purpose. This is seen in the varied criteria
for validation. For system reproduction the criteria is
direct replication; for comparison of COA it is tempered
replication; for instruction it is the effect on student
cognitive processes; and for non-existent universes it is
logical consistency and reliability.
Within each of these somewhat varied validation criteria
there does exist a common thread, and that thread is
replication of an existing reference system. In the first
two cases it is explicitly stated, and in the last two cases
replication becomes a practical, useful criteria by default.
In so much as the multi-stage approach explicitly treats
replication as a criteria, its applicability in each case is
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supported. However, there is a provisional requirement.
Since model purpose refines the implementation of the
criteria, the multi-stage approach must account for this
refinement
.
A method of incorporating model purpose into the multi-
stage validation process is to use model purpose to establish
the initial criteria for validation. The criteria would be
consistent across models of the same purpose but would be
allowed to change when model purpose differed. Thus, model
purpose would be used to divide models into classes, within
which the validation criteria would be the same. A revised
approach could then be described as follows.
1. Define model purpose and establish a framework of
validation criteria based on the purpose.
2. Establish face validity.
3
.
Empirically test model hypotheses
.
4. Empirically test the model's predictive abilities.
25
IV. THE REFERENCE SYSTEM
Accepting the previously addressed theoretical problems
associated with defining reality, consideration is now turned
to the more practical issue of establishing the best
reference system to represent reality. This reference system
will represent the baseline from which the validity of a
simulation will be judged.
Characteristics of a "good" reference system are accuracy
of representation, detail of representation, and accuracy of
measurement. The first addresses the ability of the
reference system to capture the causal relationships of the
real system. The second characteristic concerns itself with
the level of technological detail the reference system
provides to the modeler. The final characteristic concerns
itself with the measurement accuracy the reference system
offers of the interactions and effects of the represented
relationships
.
As previously mentioned, there are three reference
systems most often proposed for the validation process.
These are expert opinion, historical combat data, and
exercise/test data. Each of these will be addressed and
assessed in regards to their advantages and disadvantages as
a reference system.
A. EXPERT OPINION
Expert opinion consists of the views, perceptions,
instinct, and acquired knowledge of those who have been and
are closely associated with the system under study.
Depending on the system under study "expert" status can be
gained through experience with the system, or through
academic study of the system. In the case of combat, it is a
mix of both of these elements that characterizes an expert.
The most qualified expert is one who has an experience base
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that has been continually and extensively expanded through
academic endeavor. The application of expert opinion as a
reference system would involve the use of expert opinion to
identify the correctness of hypotheses associated with
particular combat processes. A consensus of some type would
need to be generated and documented. This reference system,
while consensus could be difficult, could be updated
periodically as the climate of combat is perceived to change
over time.
1 . Advantages
Those who have experienced combat and have studied
the various aspects of war have particular insights into the
actual relationships and structures of combat. These
insights cannot be replicated with numerical descriptions of
combat. They are based on a conscious and subconscious
understanding of the intrinsic relationships of combat. To a
large extent they represent the behavioral content of combat.
Weapon systems, in an inert or controlled environment, can be
adequately described through mathematical representation of
their characteristics. This is not the case when man, and
consequently human behavior is involved. How does the
inclusion of man, who has the ability to gather and process
information and change his behavior accordingly, affect
system performance? How do the intangibles; leadership,
morale, group cohesiveness, and courage, affect the
relationships inherent in the system? Attempts at the
quantification of human behavior in combat have not met with
much success [Ref.l, p. 32]. Until progress in this area
occurs, the major source of information about the effects of
these variables will be expert opinion.
A second advantage of expert opinion is its ability
to present a holistic interpretation of the processes and
structures of combat. In general, the application of
scientific methodology to the study of combat divides combat
into component parts, examines the simpler parts, and then
27
rebuilds the system. This process overlooks the intrinsic
relationships between various components of the combat. One
of the most important concepts not captured by this approach
is that of synergism. The expert can provide this view of
combat. He can identify those hidden interactions that make
the sum of the parts greater than the whole.
The formulation and interpretation of "squishy"
problems are unavoidably judgmental and are inherently
connected. Thus, if an experienced professional officer,
speaking of a particular hypothesis, says "This doesn't make





Just as the advantages of expert opinion revolved
around human behavior considerations, so do the
disadvantages. The way each person is brought up, the
inherent position of the individual, and the goal orientation
of an individual affects the way he views the world and the
way he records what he views. Different people identify
different issues as being the most relevant to the events
they are viewing or experiencing. Consider, for example, a
combat engagement experienced by three soldiers. One is a
lieutenant, another is a sergeant, and the last is a private.
Each will be sensitive to certain aspects of his environment
and even though all three went through essentially the same
experience, the differences in their accounts of the
experience may be large. A more macro example of perceptual
bias is captured in the phrase "The winner gets to write the
history books." Recounts of the progress of the events of
World War II, the causal relationships between those events,
and the relative importance of different events , receive
different emphasis depending on whether the basis of
knowledge is from an American, a Russian, or a German. The
question that becomes relevant in this case is which view
best represents the reality of what occurred. The
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perceptual bias may be undetectable when experts of similar
backgrounds, culture, and experience are providing the
3
representation of reality.
Related deficiencies in the use of expert opinion for
a reference system are a lack of detail and quantitative
accuracy. The human mind is limited in the amount of detail
it can provide with regard to specific events. This lack of
detail is usually caused by overflow in the short term memory
during the event occurrence [Ref.17, p. 646] . Thus while
experts can provide a very realistic, insightful description
of combat processes on a general scale, as the need for more
detailed data grows, the experts falter. Human limitations
in quantitative information processing also detracts from the
effectiveness of expert opinion as a reference system. While
one is generally willing to say which weapon is better than
another, when asked for a number that describes how much
better, answers come hesitantly. Wholistic reasoning is
relatively easy for humans but quantitative, computational
reasoning is much more difficult [Ref.17, p. 645].
A less serious disadvantage is one of parochialism.
Knowledge that an expert gains from experience is often
local, and therefore provisional upon the circumstances and
environment of the experience. The provisional aspects of the
experience are often forgotten as the experience is
translated to a broader scope. It is part of human nature to
inductively transfer local experiences into general rules.
When the number of local experiences is limited, as is the
general case of combat experience, the generalization of
personal experiences to general rules is hazardous. This
disadvantage of expert opinion can never be completely
overcome, but certain steps can be taken to minimize its
impact. One is to give the problem an appropriate amount of
A detailed list of cognitive biases is provided in
Appendix A. These biases effect both perception and recall,
and with the effects of short term memory impact heavily on
human quantitative ability.
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concern, and another is to limit the effect of parochialism
by amalgamating the experiences from many sources.
A final disadvantage of expert opinion is in the
relationship between the experts and the modeler.
Particularly in the military, the experts are the clients of
the modeler. The problem is, then, to what extent do
modelers bend objectivity, and sound hypotheses to please
their clients.
--perhaps many of us poor analysts have yielded to the
pressure of our customers and our friends, and we are
discovering we are all members of the same club. We are
all yielding to the pressures and modifying our work
because it doesn't suit General So-and-So's intuition, so
we've got to pull it back a little bit over here, and lo
and behold, when we run something which is essentially a
probablistic type solution, sure we get a number that lies
between zero and one, and somebody else has too, and it
probably lies where people want it to be. [Ref.3, p. 110]
The experts that have experienced combat and have studied war
extensively are one and the same as the senior military
leaders who have dedicated their lives to military service.
These senior military leaders are the decisionmakers that say
"yea" or "nay" to the purchase and use of a particular
simulation. When these decisionmakers also provide the basis
of the reference system upon which the simulations are
developed, the models reflect the predisposition of the
decisonmakers and all the underlying motivations to which
they are subject. These underlying motivations may be other
than to provide a realistic, useful model.
B. HISTORICAL COMBAT DATA
It is again worthy to note that the strongest determinant
of what will occur tomorrow is what is happening today. The
present and the future are inextricably tied to the past.
The only "real" data on "real" combat exists in the past
tense. Historical combat data is that information that has
been gathered from past conflicts.
The ordered collection and analysis of this type of
information has only begun to be seriously addressed in
recent years. One of the strongest proponents for the use of
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historical data for validation, Col. (Ret) Trevor Dupuy,
founded the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization.
This organization is the only such organization in the U.S.
pursuing this extensive cataloging and analysis of historical
combat data [Ref.18, p.na]
The use of historical combat data in the validation
process makes the validation question one of whether the
retrospective fit of the simulation to the past is strong
enough to warrant confidence in the simulation. Historical
data would provide input and parameter values to the
simulation. The simulation would then be run and the outputs




The first and obvious advantage of historical combat
data is that it comes from actual conflict. All the "dirty"
aspects of war are captured in this data. The impact of the
actual level of troop training, the failure of
communications, the imperfect execution of orders, the havoc
weather plays on the best of plans, uncertain intelligence,
and all the implications of less than perfect logistics are
represented in this data. More importantly, this data is a
true reflection of human involvement in the combat system.
While most of the other factors might be adequately estimated
in other ways, the implications of facing life threatening
situations is still largely a mystery. Only "real" combat
data is from situations where men actually faced the
immediate prospect of losing their lives. This aspect of war
cannot be duplicated in peacetime.
Another major advantage of historical data is that it
provides one the opportunity to investigate the time
independent principles of combat.
Although new technology, more sophisticated armaments, and
indeed the new geopolitical implications of major conflicts
have demanded changes in the art of warfare, no one can
afford to ignore what has been done in the past . Whatever
the changes in methodology and tactical concepts, basic
principles that have found their roots in the evolution of
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warfare itself remain very much the same. It is therefore
from the sound knowledge of former battles, from the study
of military thought, that one can refine one's judgement,
develop one's skills, and have a basis for developing the
new tactical concepts necessary to the modern battlefield.
[Ref.19, p.vii]
One need only examine the writings of Sun Tzu, Saxe,
Clausewitz, and Jomini to find evidence that these principles
exist. Each of these men identified similar hypotheses
regarding certain relationships in combat. The fact that they
show up in the writings of men vastly separated by history
argues for the existence of these time independent
principles. Historical data is the only reasonable source for
investigating time independent trends and subsequently




While combat data has an intuitive appeal for use as
a reference system, it is, unfortunately , replete with
shortcomings and pitfalls. The first revolves around the
previously discussed issue of the purpose of combat. Its
purpose is not to provide data for later analysis, and
therefore, the participants primary concern is not with the
collection and recording of such data. Combat data suffers
extensively form both a lack of completeness and of accuracy.
Even when good data is available on the output side of the
conflict (ie. attrition, movement of frontlines, etc
. ) , the
input variables have never been well recorded
[Ref.20, p. 336]. These variables include the amount of ammo
available, the actual orders issued, and many others.
Another issue in the area of completeness is the one
sidedness of the data collected. Data on the enemy, either
input or output, is much harder to come by. Information on
the size of the enemy force in any engagement, their tactical
procedure, and their logistical status is often lost as soon
as the battle is over. The enemy, as do we, take conscious
steps to keep this type of information from becoming
available. The result is that even when friendly data is
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fairly complete, the historical data is not usable because
the two sided aspect of conflict is not represented.
There are two primary sources of historical data:
archives and official military histories. The National
Archive data is spotty and requires great effort to extract.
Figure 1 illustrates the incompleteness of these records. The
availability of records about the 79th Division in late 1944
is depicted and the gaps are easily identifiable.
[Ref.21, p. 10]
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In the case of official military histories, published by the
US Army, the accounts are rich with qualitative descriptions
of the events of war, but they lack tables, graphs or
appendices with quantitative data. Figure 2 notes the dat-a
available from a group of World War II Army histories. If
the history systematically presented any data, the work
received credit for data being present. The conclusion is
straightforward, combat data is generally not complete enough
to provide a reference system for the validation process.
[Ref.21, p. 12]
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A general lack of accuracy also is prevalent in
historical combat data. One ill-fated example of this was
the body counts of the Vietnam War. After an engagement,
dead bodies of the enemy were counted and reported to higher
headquarters. These reports were often best guesses rather
than accurate reports of the dead. This occurred for a number
of reasons. The enemy, when possible, took their dead with
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them. Additionally, even when friendly forces were forced
back and no opportunity to count dead existed, body count
reports were required. Leaders on the ground reported counts
that included estimates of those uncountable dead. There
were a distinct pressures to report more liberal than
conservative estimates of the body count. These pressures
were based on the political uses of the reported numbers, and
the anticipated effect poor numbers would have on one's
career. These types of pressures, while never exactly the
same will always be there to affect the accuracy of any data
collected during actual combat. The incompleteness and
inaccuracy issues cause combat data to be reported and
subsequently used in the aggregate. This, of course, is not
acceptable when considering high resolution combat models.
Another significant disadvantage of combat data is
that it does deal with past conflicts. A criticism of the
American military is that it constantly prepares to win the
last war fought. This comment emphasizes the change that is
associated with combat. War is a competitive sport that has
on each side intelligent, clever, industrious, and
resourceful players, namely men. Man processes past
information and constantly attempts to change the
environment, climate, and conduct of battle to give his
particular side the advantage. This relative advantage shifts
again and again over time, and each shift is a shift away
from previous characterizations of conflict. In particular,
new weapons, new tactics, and new political objectives change
the characteristics of battle. One only needs to review the
effect of tanks in World War II to see evidence of the change
in the character of battle.
As time passes, the gulf between past conflict and
present day conflict increases. Since most of American
conventional combat data is from World War II and the Korean
War, this gulf is significant. In fact, the characteristics,
interactions, and results of present day conflict may well be
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outside the domain of possibilities established by this
historical data.
Finally, the same problems of perceptual bias as
described in the case of expert opinion, are present in
historical data. These biases are impossible to deal with.
While with expert opinion, the experts could be interrogated
to establish the presence of bias, no such opportunity exists
with historical data. Historical data rests on unalterable
pages of print, most often without clues as to who, how, and
under what conditions it was recorded. Thus, bias existing in
historical data has a greater impact than if it exists in
expert opinion.
C. EXERCISE/TEST DATA
Exercise/test data can be characterized by its three
major sources. The most basic is technical engineering test
data. This data establishes the pristine technical
characteristics of weapon systems. Pristine is meant to
imply than humans are not yet included in the domain of the
weapon system, and environmental conditions are strictly
controlled. This data is used to define the characteristic
boundaries of weapon system performance. This data is useful
in combat modeling only as starting baseline from which
parameters and hypotheses can be further refined.
The second type of exercise/test data is from highly
structured field experiments . In this case the data
represents system performance when humans have been included
in the system domain. The system performance now is a factor
of hardware performance and human performance. Environmental
factors are still highly controlled and it is generally the
aim to establish system characteristics based on the
interaction of humans with the hardware. Independent
variables are changed incrementally to investigate and record
their effects on system performance. Most often, these
system performance characteristics are established while
attempting to maintain human performance at an optimum. In
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other words the stresses related with human performance under
combat conditions are explicitly excluded from the exercise.
The final type of exercise/test data is from open form
field exercises. These exercises are usually force on force
and allow for as much realism as safety restrictions will
permit. While some may be simulated, all aspects of combat
are generally included in these exercises . Regular soldiers
are used and human behavior and performance is allowed to
take its normal course. Environmental factors are also
uncontrolled. These exercises provide data on weapon system
performance as it interacts with the other elements of the




These data, as opposed to historical data, can
generally be collected to any practical level of completeness
and accuracy. Modern technology provides many methods for
accomplishing this collection. The limiting factors in the
completeness and accuracy of exercise data are resources and
poor planning. Accuracy and completeness come at a price, as
the desire for more complete and accurate information grows,
the cost of acquiring that information grows manyfold. Often
after an exercise is over, an analyst will bemoan the lack
of a particular piece of information. In most cases,
collection of this data could have been easily incorporated
into the exercise plan, but poor planning precluded it.
Given a reasonable amount of resources and proper planning,
exercise/test data provides the most complete and accurate
representation of the events that have occurred.
Objective data is also an important advantage of this
approach. In general, one can explicitly eliminate most
biases from the data collected. Much of the data collected
Current military doctrine defines seven combat
operating systems: Intelligence, Maneuver. Fire Support, Air
Defense, Mobility/Countermobility, Combat Service Support,
and Command and Control.
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is from instrumented sources and as such is less subject to
bias than that collected by human sources.
Another significant advantage of exercise/test data
is that it represents the current state of conflict. Current
weapons are used and current tactics are employed. In most
cases, current enemy capabilities and weapons systems are
represented as closely as possible. Depending on the level
of realism attained, this data has a closer relationship to
future conflicts than does historical data.
A final advantage of exercise/test data is
documentation. Records of who collected the data, how it was
collected, and under what conditions it was collected provide
greater insight as the data are analyzed and interpreted.
Correct documentation also provides the opportunity for




The major disadvantage of exercise/test data is the
lack of realism that often exists in these exercises. One
unavoidable cause of unrealistic conditions is the
requirement for safety restrictions that would not be in
effect in time of war. It is not actual combat and
therefore, soldiers are not put in uncontrolled high risk
situations. Another factor that detracts from realism is
participants knowledge that it is, in fact, an exercise.
This knowledge removes many of the pressures associated with
combat. Some of the pressures and stress are replaced by
other stress inducing variables, but there is no doubt that
human behavior in exercises is different than that in combat.
Realism is also hampered by the devices and methods used to
record the desired data. The devices for data measurement
are often connected to or carried on weapon systems and may
inadvertently change the operating characteristics of those
weapons. These devices may also have an effect on the way
the operator interacts with a particular system. The methods
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of data collection may impose requirements on the
participating organizations that alters their standard
operating procedures. Thus, even though the data collected
may be highly comprehensive and extremely accurate, it may
reflect events and relationships that different from those
that would actually exist in combat
.
A by-product of participant knowledge and the lack of
transparency in measurement devices and methodologies is
gamesmanship. Gamesmanship describes the use of known
artificialities of the exercise to bias the outcomes and
processes of the exercise in one's favor. The exercise
participants adjust their behavior to maximize the benefits
offered by these artificialities. This adjustment of
behavior is natural and expected of soldiers in a combat
environment. The problem is that in combat they are
adjusting their behavior based on changes in real world
inputs, while in the exercise the adjustments are based on
the artificialities of the exercise. Consequently, the
events and processes observed are not reflective of reality
but of the artificialities of the exercise.
D. SUMMARY
The question remains, "What is the best choice for a
reference system in support of the validation process?"
Figure 3 summarizes the analysis in terms of the stated
characteristics of a good reference system.
Each option exhibits deficiencies in one area or
another. The nature of these deficiencies make it difficult
to evaluate them relative to each other. Another approach
other than direct comparison may be taken to identify the
option that will provide the best reference system. This
approach is to examine the possibilities of eliminating the
deficiencies currently attributed to each option. This






EXPERT OPINION BETTER WORST WORST
HISTORICAL COMBAT DATA BEST BETTER BETTER
EXERCISE/TEST DATA worst BEST BEST
Figure 3
Removing the deficiencies associated with expert opinion
involves changing the mental characteristics of humans. It
would require an increase in short term memory capacity, and
a change in the way human beings process information. This
is unlikely in the near future, if ever, and therefore
precludes serious improvements of expert opinion as a
reference system.
Alleviating the problems associated with historical
combat data may be approached in two ways. The first
approach involves locating historical data that has not yet
been brought to light. This data might then, if extensive
enough, increase the level of completeness and detail of
existing historical data. Considering the amount of effort
this would entail, this approach would only be reasonable if
there existed large amounts of "undiscovered" historical
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combat data. This is not likely and this approach offers
little help in alleviating the deficiencies of historical
combat data. The second approach is only mentioned for
completeness and involves the requirement of a new conflict
in which data of appropriate completeness and accuracy might
be gathered . This approach is set aside without discussion due
to its obvious detractors
.
The problem with exercise /test data is one of realism.
If there were methods to increase the level of realism in
exercises, this data might prove worthwhile as a reference
system. The limitations in achieving realism are primarily
technological shortcomings and the obvious unwillingness to
kill soldiers in exercises. Technological advancements are
being made constantly, so the opportunity for eliminating
lack of realism from exercise data does exist.
Of the three choices, only exercise/test data offers a
reasonable approach to overcoming deficiencies associated
with use as a reference system for the validation process.
In fact, efforts to introduce more realism into training
exercises has been a top priority in the Army for years . The
next chapter examines the National Training Center as a
source of detailed, realistic, and accurate data for use as a
reference system for the validation process
.
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V. THE NTC A3 A REFERENCE SYSTEM
It has long been the policy of the United States Army to
train its personnel in the manner that they are expected to
fight in combat. Paramount in this goal has been the
continued effort to conduct this training under conditions
that are as close to combat as possible. The replication of
combat conditions include environmental conditions, the





Modern weapons and equipment have increased the tempo,
lethality, and size of the modern battlefield. These changes
have made it increasingly more difficult for the Army to
ensure realism in home station training. The close proximity
of civilian communities limit the use of aircraft, electronic
warfare, live fire, smoke, and gas even though they are real
world components of the modern battlefield. Land in these
areas has competing uses, and the Army is hard pressed to
establish large expanses of land for training. Additionally,
home stations do not have the resources to maintain an
"enemy" against which to train.
The culmination of efforts to overcome these ever
increasing deficiencies was the development of the National
Training Center (NTC) . The NTC is located in the Mojave
Desert at Fort Irwin, California. It encompasses 1000 square
miles of rugged mountains
, dried up lakes, and open desert
[Ref .22, p.l] . The nearest civilian community is located 40
kilometers away. The NTC has the specific mission of
providing realistic training to Battalion size units and
below.
A. ESTABLISHING REALISM
Many factors are considered in providing a realistic
environment for training at the NTC. Units deploy to the NTC
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in the same fashion that they would deploy to actual combat.
Their training is conducted over a period of fourteen days
with little rest or respite from the environment of the
Mojave Desert. About ten combat missions are conducted
including live fire training and force on force engagements.
The unit's higher headquarters as well as logistic,
artillery, engineer, and air assets deploy with it to
maintain realism in the command and control structure and the
other functional systems of combat. The most important of
these factors deserve further attention.
1 . "Enemy" Force
An opposing force of two battalions, one armor and
one infantry, is maintained at the NTC . These soldiers wear
Soviet style uniforms and are trained in the methods and
tactics the Soviets use in combat. Their training is updated
periodically to ensure that the opposing force methods and
tactics stay current with enemy doctrine and procedures.
American vehicles and equipment have been visually modified
to be extremely representative of their Soviet counterparts.
2 . Maneuver
Choice of vehicle and unit speed, driving techniques,
and vehicle formations are all at the discretion of the
commanders, leaders, and soldiers involved in the exercise.
The size of the training area ensures that mission boundaries
are not artificially influenced by training area boundaries .
Responsibility for maintaining the force (safety
considerations, etc.) are left to the discretion of the unit
commanders as they would be in actual combat . The bottom
line is if that's the way one would maneuver in combat
that's the way one maneuvers at the NTC.
There is one small animal watering hole that is in the
maneuver area but off limits. It is incorporated into the
relevant missions by designating it as a contaminated area.
The high personnel and vehicle accident rates are an




Realism in command and control is maintained by the
training unit receiving all its orders from its parent unit
as it would during war. The Brigade receives plans and
orders from a Division cell that the NTC maintains. It then
processes those orders and provides plans and orders to the
task force as it would during actual combat. Command and
control internal to the task force is exactly as it would be
in combat. The leaders are responsible for the operation and
the welfare of their men, without interference from the
control elements of the NTC.
4 . Weapon System Engagement Simulation
A critical portion of the establishment of realism at
the NTC is the use of the Multiple Integrated Laser
7Engagement System (MILES) to simulate the realistic exchange
of weapon fires on the battlefield. This system provides
realistic simulation of the weapons employed ( range,
relative killing ability, times of flight, etc.) and allows
the "killing" of soldiers in the exercise. MILES provides a
transparent, event driven method of casualty assessment,
which is integral to any realistic representation of combat.
5 . Mobility/Countermobility
The employment and clearing of all types of obstacles
is allowed. Unlike other training areas, particularly those
overseas, the NTC has no restrictions on what can or cannot
be done to the land. What is done is driven by the tactical
requirements of the mission. In fact, soldiers are expected
to "dig in" every opportunity they get. The unit commanders
of both the friendly and opposing forces decide on obstacle
emplacement. These obstacles, while increasing the potential
for injury, receive no special markings and are real word
limitations to maneuver.




Nuclear and Chemical Effects
Nuclear weapons are not often played at the NTC due
to the catastrophic results of their employment on battalion
size units and below. Use of a "nuke", even a small one,
effectively stops play at the small unit high resolution
level . Chemical use, on the other hand, is exercised
Q
significantly. CS is the primary simulator for the various
types of gases and chemicals that are expected to be used on
the battlefield. Soldiers react realistically, donning gas
masks, etc., to avoid the discomfort caused by the gas. Tied
closely to the use of CS are chemical detection packets.
These packets are exactly the same as the real ones, except
that they have been treated to exhibit the presence of a
particular chemical agent. In this fashion the chemical play
at the NTC is made sensitive to the different types of
chemicals that may be used on the modern battlefield. When
participating personnel are attacked with chemical munitions,
and "contaminated" they are not allowed to assume an
unprotected posture without carrying out a decontamination
process
.
7 . Electronic Warfare
The isolation of the NTC offers the advantage of
realistic use of jammers and other electronic measures
against friendly communications. It is known that the enemy
plans extensive use of jamming, electronic deception, and
communication intelligence collecting in the next conflict.
The opposing force employs all these methods in its "battle"
against the friendly task force. In one instance, the
opposing force successfully tracked and jammed battalion
command level communication through three frequency changes.
This is representative of enemy capabilities and in a large
part depends on the communication discipline of the
participating unit.
A gas that, when inhaled or when it comes in contact
with eyes nose or mouth, causes much discomfort. Commonly
used to disperse riots. No long term detrimental effects.
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8. Close Air Support
The Air Force provides fixed wing aircraft for the
close air support missions at the NTC. Participating units
must request and plan for this support in accordance with
standard combat procedure. Close air support is available to
both the opposing and friendly forces and is used in both the
live fire training as well as the force on force exercises.
9. Logistics
Logistics is a significant, some say overriding,
factor of combat operations that is often excluded from
exercises. At the NTC the logistics play is even more real
than other functional systems because the logistic processes
are in fact real . They are real in the sense that soldiers
really don't eat, vehicles really do run out of gas, weapons
don't have rounds for firing, and broken equipment stays
broken if the logistic system is not operated correctly.
a . Medical
Each soldier carries a card that indicates, in
the event that he is "shot", what his particular "wounds"
are, or that he has been "killed". Soldiers' weapons are
deactivated when they are shot and they may not return to the
battle until they have been properly treated by appropriate
personnel. Those soldiers with "wounds" that would require
evacuation in real combat must be physically evacuated at the
NTC. If the soldier's "wounds" cause "death", the medics and
logistic personnel are required to process the "remains".
Those soldiers "killed" are pooled to provide a source of
personnel to simulate the replacement system. They are
returned to their units as replacements after the appropriate
procedures have been completed.
b. Food and Fuel
These are real commodities provided in the same
fashion as they would be in combat . The enemy may interdict
supply lines and deny these supplies to the friendly force.
If proper requests, tactics, and linkups do not occur, no
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special administrative action is taken to alleviate the
problem. It is up to the commanders and leaders to ensure
proper logistic support.
c . Ammunition
Live ammunition is supplied in requested amounts
for the live fire range. This ammunition is exactly what
would be used in war and supply is controlled, as in combat,
by the Required Supply Rate and the Controlled Supply Rate.
This precludes an unrealistic abundance of ammunition.
In the force on force engagements, two methods of
ammunition resupply and accountability are used. With the
9exception of Stingers and indirect fire weapons, the weapon
systems have blank rounds that simulate the firing effects of
the weapon. These blanks also activate the MILES devices on
each weapon. If the rounds run out, the weapon will not fire;
if the blank rounds are bad the weapon will not respond, and
these rounds must be physically transported around the
battlefield. Blank rounds coupled with MILES provides an
extremely realistic representation of weapon system firing
and interaction.
In the case of stingers and indirect fire
weapons, Colonel Larry Word, a senior observer at the NTC for
over three years, provides an explanatory example of the
process
.
If the commander wants to use the battalion mortars to
smoke and wants to build up his smoke capability, he
requisitions ammunition. A piece of paper will say, I am
a box of ir4.2 smoke." To resupply the 4.2 platoon, two
five-tons might come rolling up and all they have in the
front seat are a stack of these cards. In actuality they
would be loaded with 4.2 ammo. The paper ammo is put in
the FDC. If he fires twelve rounds of smoke, our
controllers pull twelve of those cards that say, "I
represent so much ammunition." When the paper runs out, he
has run out of ammunition and must request additional. It
has to be hauled up in the appropriate manner.
[Ref.23, p. 19]
Stingers are a relatively new man portable air defense
missile system. The are fire and forget type missiles and as
such cannot be adequately representee! by MTLES
.
These are standard military trucks with a five ton
load capacity.
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Controllers inspect vehicles periodically and confiscate
simulated ammunition that, if the ammunition was real, could
not physically be carried on the vehicle.
d . Maintenance
All repair parts supply, replacement vehicles,
and maintenance activities are conducted as they would be in
combat. If a vehicle becomes "damaged" or "destroyed" due to
a MILES hit, damage assessment is done and the vehicle must
go through the combat maintenance process before it will be
returned to the battle. If this requires maintenance
personnel then they must go to the vehicle and stay with the
vehicle for amount of time that would have been required for
actual repair. If the vehicle would have required
evacuation, a recovery vehicle must move to its location and
drive with it back to the maintenance area. These
requirements ensure that the availability of vehicles and
equipment is realistically simulated.
10 . Summary
A final consideration is of the men who participate
in the exercises at the NTC
.
The soldiers that participate in these exercises are those
soldiers who are expected to engage in actual combat if the
need should arise. They are the soldiers who are subject
to fallacies in judgment, who are susceptible to an
opposing force commander's guile, and who are capable of
seizing the opportunity of the moment. In other words, the
data from these scenarios will emulate to as high degree as
possible the results expected from combat due to actual
hostilities. [Ref.27, p. 4]
With the inclusion of those who would, in time of war,
actually be doing the fighting, the NTC data captures the
impact of human performance.
The result of these efforts is a battle environment
as close to real combat as technology and safety restrictions
permit. A final consideration is of the men who participate
in the exercises at the NTC. NTC represents "the most
realistic engagement simulation and live fire Battalion task
force tactical training available to a modern peacetime Army"
[Ref .24, p.v] . The true impact of the realism at NTC is well
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illustrated by an NCO that described his own experience at
the NTC.
They had never faced five to one odds; faced an enemy that
would close at 20 kph and accept the losses/ or tried to
acquire targets buttoned up, in full NBC protective
clothing, while under artillery and smoke. [Ref.25, p. 20]
An important consideration to note is the high degree
of confidence that senior military leaders have in the
realism established at the NTC. As a result of this
confidence, NTC results have a significant impact on many
policy decisions throughout the Army. If high resolution
simulations could be validated against this source of combat
realism, it is reasonable to expect that adequate correlation
between the two might earn some level of confidence for the
simulation. To accomplish this, data is required. The
methods of data collection at the NTC and the status of data
availability and usefulness are addressed in the next
sections of this chapter.
B. DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS11
Systems currently active in collecting data at the NTC
are the Instrumentation System, Observer/Controller Logs, and
Communication Tapes. These collection systems offer a broad
range of both qualitative and quantitative information. The
operation and characteristics of each system is separately
considered in the following sections.
1 . The Instrumentation System
The instrumentation system consists of three
subsystems
:
1. The Range Data Measurement System (RDMS)
2. The Core Instrumentation System (CIS)
3. The Live Fire Subsystem (LFS)
From these instrumentation subsystems three types of data are
collected: raw field data, manual input data, and derived
Even though upgrades have been conceptualized and
some implementation plans made, consideration has been
limited to existing systems. Improvements can be expected to
increase the reliability of the data collected.
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data. The RDMS collects the raw field data, manual input
data is recorded through the CIS, and derived data is
developed from manipulation of either or both of the previous
data types [Ref.26, p. 2]. Figure 4 depicts the organization
of the major elements of the RDMS and the CIS. It also
illustrates the transfer of data among the system.
a. RDMS
The primary components of the RDMS are
colloquially referred to as the "B unit" and the "A station".
B units are transmit devices mounted on participating
personnel and vehicles . A stations are receiving units
located on hilltops throughout the NTC . The A stations
gather data from the B units and retransmit the data to a
computer for storage and analysis. The A stations act as a
distributed network of data collection nodes, while the B
units are the data producers of the system.
The B units are integrated with the MILES system
and are a source of many types of data. A position location
signal is one of the primary data elements transmitted. It
is continually transmitted by the B unit and is periodically
received by the A station. These signals are omni-
directional and through receipt at multiple A stations,
triangulation is performed to accurately locate each vehicle.
The system updates vehicle positions every fifteen seconds.
The B unit also transmits data pertinent to the operation of
MILES. The B unit transmits the time of weapon firing, the
type of weapon firing, and the specific vehicle to which the
weapon belongs. The A station gathers this data and sends it
to a central computer. Additionally, as sensors on a target
register receipt of a laser pulse, the B unit will transmit
the near miss, hit, or kill status of the shot, and the type
of weapon that fired. Each B unit is registered to a
specific vehicle. This allows the linking of data to each



























































opposing force elements. Figure 5 provides a synopsis of the
data elements that are logged by the RDMS . [Ref.27, p. 14]
b. CIS
The CIS, as the name implies, is the center of
instrumentation action at the NTC . It interfaces with all of
the other instrumentation systems and provides the
computational support for real time data manipulation and
feed back in support of the NTC training mission. The CIS
provides interactive graphic displays with which controllers
and analysts can "see" the battle develop.
The CIS logs data in real time and acts as the
primary source of archival data. Initialization data
regarding unit history and characteristics, as well as
preplanned actions are inputted through the CIS. The CIS is
responsible for the pairing of firing and target events from
data input from the RDMS. This pairing is done through a
time analysis matching of the input events. The CIS
additionally provides real time control of the Live Fire
Exercises, and receives input data from the Live Fire
Subsystem. [Ref.28, p. 57]
Another important function of the CIS is
artillery casualty assessment. Indirect fires cannot be
represented by MILES and require another method of
realistically providing for their significant effects on the
battlefield. The CIS receives firing data from the FDC's of
the DS artillery supporting the battalion and the battalion's
own mortars . It uses this information to run an internal
simulation that projects projectile flight paths, and the
burst location of the impacting rounds [Ref.28, p. 58]. The
system logs the event and the location of round impact. It
then relays this location to the observer/controller in the
field. The observer/controller first provides a visual and
auditory cue of the incoming rounds: smoke and artillery
burst simulators. He then assesses casualties based on the
proximity of vehicles and personnel to round impact, the
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Event received when a shot
is fired by an instrumented
weapon system Event data
consists of firer player
number and weapon type.
Ammunition Remaining
Laser Illumination
Pair of events received
immediately following
trigger pull. Tens digit in former
message, units in latter.
Event sent by target This event
is one of three differend kinds




There are four Live Fire
events pased from the targets
via RDMS. They are: target UP,
target DOWN, HIT by ballistic
projectile, and HIT by laser.
An event is sent by a player
whenever the microphone
key for either net is depressed
or released. The message
includes the net (1 or 2) and
the action (on or off).
Position / Location
Player Status
The Position/Location of each
instrumented player is derived
by RDMS software from raw
signal data and logged.
Player Status initialization
and updates, which are
entered from the CIS and
transmitted to the RDMS are
also logged. These data





protective posture of the unit, and the type of round fired.
Figure 6 provides a synopsis of the data elements logged by
the CIS.
c . Live Fire Subsystem
The Live Fire Subsystem performs two primary
missions. The first is to control the target array during
the live fire exercise. The target array is developed to be a
realistic representation of the formations used by Soviet
forces. The second is to record event data form the live
fire exercise and transmit this data to the CIS for
processing and addition to the log.
The target array is made up of remote controlled
vehicle and personnel targets. These targets are all
outfitted with remote controlled fire effects devices. That
is to say, when the target is displayed it simulates firing
at the friendly forces through the use of certain flash and
smoke devices. These devices are used to increase the
realism of the target array. Additionally, the targets are
cut to represent full size silhouettes of the vehicle they
represent. The targets also have kill indicators that
activate when the sensors of the target register a hit. The
hit sensors register both ballistic and laser weapon
engagements. The ballistic sensors have internal sensitivity
settings that are set to maintain the appropriate hierarchial
order of weapon systems on the battlefield. These settings
ensure that targets representing tanks are not killed by
small arms fire. The MILES sensors are used to capture the
Dragon and Tow missile systems firing effects. These weapon
systems are simulated by MILES due to the extremely
destructive effect they would have on the target array.
Destruction of the target array would require constant
replacement which is fiscally prohibitive. [Ref.28, p. 52]
Each target is equipped with a receiver
transmitter over which it receives its commands and transmits
the results of engagements. The control of the target array,
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DATA ELEMENTS OF THE CIS LOG
Data Elements Description
Background/ Documentation History and mission name, start
and end temes, mission type,
exercise conditions, task force,
and OPFOR organizations.
Unit/ Player Status Info Status of individual players
and/or units including:
Instrumented / Not Instrumented
Tracked /Not Tracked
Position / Location
Fire Event (ROMS) Event generated when a shot
is fired by an instrumented
weapon system. Should be
identical to RDMS log with the
exception of invalid events.
Pairing
Event generated when the laser
sensors of an instrumented
target system are illuminated
and decoded into a valid
message. If possible, target is
paired with a firer.
Control Measures Locations for control measures
entered from IDCC. This includes
control measure updates and mines.
Indirect Fire Casualty
Assessment (IFCAS)
Fire mission number assessment
of number of casualties inflicted.
Call Fire Missions Call for previously planned
mderect fire.
Commo Player identification, radio net,
and duration of commo messages
longer than 55 seconds, should
agree with RDMS log for those
but all others are lost.
Figure 6
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the collection of the target data, and the transmitting of
this data to the CIS is accomplished by the range control
system illustrated in Figure 7.
The computer at the center of the system is
programmed to present a realistic target sequence over time.
The computer keeps track of those targets that have been
killed and does not present their subsequent representation
to the friendly forces. This reinforces realism in that the
participants of the exercise can see the effects of attrition
as the enemy closes with them. The computer also records and
stores target event data transmitted from the targets, and
then relays it to the CIS.
There is a second portion of this system that
monitors the actions of the friendly forces. Friendly weapon
systems are fitted with interface devices that are
keyed by the firing of the weapon. This device is connected
to the position location system and together they provide
firing event data and position data to the computer. The
computer once again relays this information to the CIS for
processing and evaluation. This data along with other
pertinent data are logged in the CIS log for the live fire
mission. [Ref.28, p. 55]
2 . Observer/Controller Logs
There are observer/controllers (OC's) watching every
battle that occurs at the NTC. Their goal is to be
unobtrusive, but accomplish these missions:
1
.
Enforce the rules of engagement
2. Assess indirect fire casualties
3 Implement indirect fire weapon effects cues
4 Record and communicate the results of friendly
engagement simulation activities based on human
observation. [Ref.24, p. 11]
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To accomplish the last task, a number of manual records are
kept, some of which get transferred to the database. These
records supplement the data gathered by the instrumentation




system. While the details of a kill are recorded in the CIS
only if a pairing of firer to target is accomplished, the OC
in the field gathers details on every kill. When a vehicle
is killed in the field, MILES internally records the kill,
as well as the weapon type of the killer. OC s collect and
record information on all kills, paired or not, to complete
the killing record. [Ref.24, p. 8]
OC s also keep "notes" on the battles they observe.
These notes are primarily used for discussion during the
After Action Reviews, but are also significant sources of
insightful information. The OC s can identify what facets of
the battle were important or contributed most to the outcome.
They can, for example, note that the soldiers of a particular
unit were asleep due to exhaustion, and that as a result were
caught offguard by the opposing force. This type of
information is not available from the electronic data
recorded by the instrumentation system, but is necessary to
understand the "Why's and Wherefores" of the battle.
A final type of manual log that is maintained is this
artillery log. These logs are detailed records kept by the
officers of the artillery Training Analysis Feedback Team
(TAF) [Ref.24, p. 8]. Indirect fires cannot be simulated by
MILES and therefore event records of artillery firings are
not automatically generated. While the event of firing and
the impact point of the engagement are manually inputted into
the computer system, the results of the casualty assessment
are not. These results, along with other information, are
maintained in the artillery logs.
3 . Communication Tapes
The primary means of communication during tactical
operations at the battalion level and below are tactical
radios. The NTC maintains a 40 channel radio frequency
monitoring system, that records transmissions over all nets
used during the rotation. These tapes are an excellent
source of descriptive detail and contextual information about
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the battles recorded. Also, depending on the communication
discipline of the administrative/logistic net, quantitative
information on personnel and logistic operations is
available
.
Any attempt to use this data requires an extensive
expenditure of manhours . The tapes, because of their nature,
must be accessed sequentially, and the rate of information
transfer is limited by auditory input capability. For a
normal rotation of fourteen days these tapes represent 560
days of recordings. The tapes also provide no way of
identifying signal overlap. This is the phenomenon of the
closeness of hardware or frequencies causing bleedover from
one channel to another. This bleedover would be recorded as
normal transmissions. The tapes are also not time
synchronized to allow comparison of same time communication
on different channels. [Ref.29, p. 8]
Due to the primarily qualitative data available from
these tapes and the difficulty of extracting useful
information from them, further consideration of their use as
part of the reference system is discontinued.
C. DATA AVAILABILITY
Data supplied by the data collection systems are
processed and then stored for future use in a NTC Research
Database. This database is maintained by an element of the
Army Research Institute at the Presidio of Monterey in
California. The current database is a result of a recent
(1987), extensive revision of the NTC database system. This
revision was accomplished to eliminate excessive redundancies
in the database and to enrich the content of the database in
terms of the data that perspective users desired. The
approach now used divides the database into two parts. The
first is the tactical database and contains all digital data
form the CIS and RDMS logs. The second part is the technical




TABLES OF THE NTC RESEARCH DATABASE
1. Mission Identification Table
2. Player State Initialization Table
3. Player State Update Table
4. Unit State linitalization Table
5. Unit State Update Table
6. Unit Type Table
7. Player/ Vehicle/ Weapon Code Table
8. Firing Event Table
9. Pairing Event Table
10 Communications Table
11. Ground Player Position Location Table
12. Air Player Position Location Table
13. IFCAS1 Target Table
14. IFCAS Target Group Table
15. IFCAS Missions Fired Table
17. Minefield Casualties Table
18. Control Measure Table
19. Control Measure Add Table
Figure 8
The tactical database is composed of nineteen tables, and
a separate one is generated for each mission. A list of
these tables is shown in Figure 8, and a detailed listing of
the data elements in each table is presented in Appendix C.
These tables and their associated data elements were
chosen to allow for the inclusion of the maximum amount of
information in a format that facilitates access for currently
defined areas of research [Ref.30, p. 2]. The database is
implemented in an INGRESS relational database. This provides
great capability for cross-referencing data, grouping data,
and selecting data based on specified qualifiers.
D. DATA ANALYSIS
Thus far, the NTC has been found to simulate combat in a
very realistic manner. Additionally, state of the art
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technology is provided to collect the data produced, and it
is subsequently stored in a fashion that supports research
applications. The instrumentation system and other
collection systems, however, are not perfect. The impact
of the errors of the collection systems on the data collected
is the subject of this section.
1 . Digital Data
Though state of the art technology is utilized,
equipment shortages, nature, and inherent characteristics of
the collection hardware cause some corruption of the data.
Major causes of these distortions are:
1. Spurious radio frequency transmissions lead to
erroneous events.
2. Internal "noise" in sensor systems that sometimes
causes inaccurate pairing of events.
3. Normal hardware/electronic instrumentation problems
leading to the loss or duplication of some events.
4. Coverage limitations (when vehicles enter arroyos,
etc) cause loss of "track" which means no
position/location data or event records during the
time of loss of coverage.
Initialization inaccuracies occur when B units are not
properly registered with the correct player and leads
to improper assignment or the invalidation of events.
6. Equipment shortages that cause a number of the
exercise participants to be uninstrumented and leading
to the activities of some participants to not be
electronically tracked.
The digital data that is most important to combat simulation,
and most affected by these problems are the position/location
data and the firing event data. Most studies investigating
the impact of these irregularities have produced pessimistic
results. In general, they find that the most severe problem
is one of missing data [Ref .29, p. 10] . Based on the missing
data problem, arguments are presented about the non-
usability of the NTC digital data for serious quantitative
analysis. While no fault can be found with the numbers
presented in these studies, the studies have some serious
weaknesses. The data are examined in an aggregated fashion
T 3 These problems are identified in Reference 26, p. 2.
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that treats all missing data as equal. In combat, as in most
activities of life, certain aspects of, and certain
participants in the activity have greater import than others.
For example, consider the investigation of a firefight
between two company size forces. The intent of the
investigation is to gain insight into the combat between the
two forces. Is it as important to know the location of the
company supply truck as it is to know the locations of those
participants actually fighting? This is not to say that
supply activities are not important, but only that sometimes
certain activities are not important to the question at hand.
In other words, a 30% missing P/L data rate may be
disheartening, but it is not a severe problem if the data are
missing from elements that had no impact on the battle.
On the premise that different pieces of missing data
might be more or less important than others, NTC P/L data
were examined at a more micro level. P/L data were obtained
from ARI for sample missions of sample rotations. The data
were processed by a program that compared the P/L data to the
task organization and thereby identified vehicles with
missing data, vehicles with duplicate player numbers, and
vehicles with bad P/L data. This information was then
manually examined to identify the type of vehicles involved
and there respective impact on the battle. Figure 9 depicts
results of a typical examination.
The Blue Forces (exercise participants) had 50 combat
elements that had no position /location data. This
translates to a 35% missing data figure. If only this
percentage is considered, the reliability of the data set is
questionable and use of it might be extremely tenuous.
Closer consideration of the participants without
position/location data reveals some interesting insights.
The cavalry had a screening mission and were not directly
involved in the battle. The artillery and the MLRS, while
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to the rear of the battle area. The manpack stingers are man
portable air defense missiles whose operators are assigned to
subordinate units in the task force. The weapon is an area
coverage weapon and as such the exact location of the weapons
system is rarely required. The particular M577 missing data
in this case is a vehicle that belongs to the personnel and
logistic officer of the task force. As such it is the
controlling element and travels with a group of vehicles
known as the Combat Trains. The location of the Combat
Trains is known from other vehicles in the group and the
location of the M577 can thus be, albeit not exactly,
established. The f/b entry represents the Air Force
fighter/bombers that are allocated assets of the task force.
These forces, obviously, do not continuously remain in the
battle area but enter, deliver ordinance, and leave. Records
of these point events can be established from flight records
but the exact location of these fighter/bombers is not
required throughout the battle. Thus the impact of the
missing data has relatively quickly been whittled down to
that of 8 vehicles. This represents a 5% missing data figure
compared to the initial 35%. Figure 9 also indicates the
minimal impact of bad P/L data.
While the numbers associated with the Red forces are
significantly higher and represent a number of weapon types
that would contribute to the battle, Red Force tactics
minimize the impact of the missing data. The Red force
operates in a very structured fashion and examination
revealed that position data for BMPs and T-72s could be well
established through examining the location of other vehicles
in their units. For red vehicles of types comparative to the
Blue Force, the arguments reducing or eliminating the impact
of the missing data are the same. The only significantly
different problem in the Red Forces is the missing data on
their reconnaissance vehicles. These vehicles often play an
important role in the development of the battle and because
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of their mission, their positions cannot be established
through comparative means. This problem can be overcome,
with significant effort, only through extensive examination
of all available sources of exercise information.
The conclusion from this closer examination of the
impact of missing P/L data is that when considered in the
context of the battle, the impact is minimal
.
Examination of the firing event data produced similar
results. The instrumentation system captures most but not
all of the firing events that occur. This is evident when
the computer records are compared to the 0/C log of firing
events. The computer records are consistently somewhat
sparser than the 0/C logs. Use of both of these sources
provides comprehensive coverage of the firing events.
Pairing of firer to target is much weaker. Common values
associated with successful pairings are in the 5 to 10
percent range. If pairing does not occur the type weapon
responsible for a kill is not recorded. Thus, while the
connection between the firer and the target cannot always be
established, the firing events, target events, and data on
what type of weapon was responsible for kills is adequate in
terms of accuracy and completeness.
Cursory examination of other digital data indicates
that, in general, digital data collected by the NTC
instrumentation system is, with some cross-referencing and
scrubbing, suitable for use in the validation process.
2 . Manual Data
This is data that are recorded manually by either the
0/C s or members of the TAF . Some of this data is entered
and maintained on the NTC Research Database and some is not.
Two of the most significant problems with this type of data
are
:
1. Lack of standardization regarding observations recorded
by the O/C's. Standardization would support
quantification of information and statistical
manipulation, permitting more concise interpretation of
the results .
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2 . Large amounts of data requiring manual entry are
missing. Much of this data would be useful in
completing the picture of the battle. [Ref.29, p. 9]
These deficiencies generally apply to the descriptive
qualitative entries of the manual records. This portion of
the manual records are important in establishing any
irregularities associated with a particular battle. These
entries support selection of "average" battles that do not
exhibit extreme conditions or irregular circumstances. This
descriptive, qualitative data is not useful as part of the
comparative reference for the validation process because of
the unidentified, yet unavoidable biases of the O/C's.
The tabular data that is manually recorded is of much
more use. The collection format and the source of the data
eliminate subjective biases from this data. Examples of this
tabular data are the artillery logs of indirect fire events
and the kill records of the O/C's. These records are of
primary use in complementing and completing the data record
established by the instrumentation system. There are limited
problems with completeness but these problems can be avoided
by choosing samples missions appropriately.
The use of the tabular data that is manually recorded
with the digital instrumentation data provides sufficient
usable data to establish the NTC as a reference system.
E. SUMMARY
Examination of the National Training Center as a
candidate for use as a reference system in the validation
process has met with encouraging results. The NTC offers
close to real representation of combat, and provides
significant amounts of usable data about the events and
activities that occur. The NTC data is continually
reflective of current weapon technology and of the current
tactics and doctrine of both American and enemy forces. The
NTC has overcome the most serious problem with using exercise
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data as a reference system, that of realism, and as such




The previous chapters of this thesis were devoted to
establishing a foundation for the development of a
methodology for the validation of high resolution combat
simulations. After identifying the theoretical problems
associated with validation, attention was given to choosing a
general approach to the validation issue. Naylor and
Finger' s multi-stage approach was adjusted to account for the
impact of model purpose on the validation process. This
revised multi-stage approach is the basis for the development
of a more refined methodology of validation. The remaining
requirement for completing the foundation was a reference
system against which the combat simulation could be compared.
National Training Center Data was evaluated as the best
choice for a reference system.
The revised multi-stage approach consisted of four steps,













Each of these steps will be considered and expanded upon in
this chapter.
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A. DEFINING THE PURPOSE
As previously discussed the purpose for which the
simulation is developed has an impact on the validation
process. Specifically it affects the criteria against which
a simulation should be judged. Model purpose also affects
the stringency to which the evaluation criteria are applied.
Model purpose establishes, from the set of available
evaluation criteria, the subset of criteria that are
applicable to the validation of that model. For given
purpose W let w. represent the selection variable for a
particular criterion, i. If the criterion is not applicable
to the validation of models designed for purpose W, then the
value of the variable will be zero. If the criteria, i, is
applicable it will be assigned a value between zero and one.
This is a weighting value used to weight a particular
criterion's relative importance to the process with respect
to the other applicable criteria. The establishment of the
weights associated with each selection criterion will be
judgmental in nature, but approaches exist that support
reliability and consistency in these values. One such
14approach is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) which uses
pairwise comparisons between the factors to develop the
relative weights. The process starts with broad criteria
(eg. reproduction of the attrition process) and disaggregates
these into component criteria that are much easier for the
human mind to compare consistently. When comparison is
accomplished on a lower level the process then reassembles
the values to establish the relative weights between the
criteria in question. This approach is qualitative in nature
and is less burdensome to implement from a data requirement
point of view, than more quantitative approaches. If a more
The reader is referenced to T.J. Saaty's The Analytic
Hierarchy Process , McGraw Hill 1980.
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quantitative approach is desired the multiattribute utility
approach of Keeney and Raiffa may be used. [Ref.31, p. 103]
Note that the criteria and values of w- for a particular
model purpose are independent of the model under
investigation. The w.'s become a standard set of criteria,
with standard relative weights, for validation of models that
fall in the same category by purpose type. This provides for
objective, standardized comparison of models. Some criteria
belong to more than one set, but will be of different
relative importance to the validation process within the
different sets. Thus, model purpose has the effect of
breaking the available evaluation criteria into two sets:
those applicable to that purpose and those that are not.
Figure 11 illustrates this characteristic.
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15 The reader is referenced to Keeney and Raiffa,
Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value
Tradeo f fs, Wiley 19 7 6T
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The available criteria from which choices can be
made are those supported by the NTC data. This data supports
a great number of possible criteria and these criteria will
grow in number as the data collection efforts at the NTC
improve. Definition and enumeration of the currently
possible criteria are beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, the newly developed technical database is
recommended as an appropriate method for maintaining the
specific data needed to support the evaluation criteria.
Technical databases, in the context of the NTC Research
Database, are specifically developed to support particular
research efforts, and one of these technical databases could
be tailored to support the validation process. Tied directly
to the tactical database, the technical database could be set
for periodic updates as more data became available. This
would provide an automatic method of staying current with
the effects of emerging weapon systems and changing tactics
and doctrine. As these new weapons and tactics are used at
the NTC, the validation database would automatically be
updated, reflecting these changes. Validating models and
simulations against this type of database would ensure that
the models themselves underwent periodic updates, otherwise
they would not be validated and therefore not used.
Another important aspect of model purpose is the
restriction it places on the comparison of models. Since
model validation is the establishment of a particular level
of confidence in a model, an obvious extension is the
examination of the relative confidence between models. The
effect of model purpose is to limit the comparison of models
to those in the same purpose category. The validation
process, then, operates within the domain of model purpose
as illustrated in Figure 12 .
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MODEL PURPOSE AND VALIDATION
Evaluation Criteria Domain
Figure 12
The process of completing step one may be illustrated
through considering a specific example. Assume that the set
of validation criteria that NTC supports has been defined.
CASTFOREM, a high resolution, systemic combat model, is being
evaluated and the validation scenario is a standard Soviet
Motorized Rifle Regiment attacking an American Mechanized
Infantry Battalion. The purpose of the model is to
investigate the possible tactical courses of action
available to the U.S. commander. The most important tactical
aspect of the situation is the maneuver ability of the forces
involved (i.e. timeliness and position have a greater impact
on the battle than relative weapon characteristics, etc.).
Given the particular scenario and model purpose, a
distinct set of applicable validation criteria, A-, may be
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selected from the set of available criteria. Such a
selection might consist of the following evaluation criteria.
A-i : Mean loss rate of Mi's to T72's in each range band.
1 1) Range band 1-- < 1000 meters
2) Range band 2— 1000 meters < rng < 2000 meters
3) Range band 3-- 2000 meters < rng < 3000 meters
A 9 : Movement rate per vehicle in each range band.z 1) Range band 1— < 1000 meters
2) Range band 2-- 1000 meters < rng < 2000 meters
3) Range band 3-- 2000 meters < rng < 3000 meters
A3 : Range distribution of Ml shots against T72's.
When these criteria have been selected, relative weights
may be assigned to them using one of a number of available
methods. These relative weights will be used at a later time,
and for the purpose of this example are assumed to be:
A-l > w^ = .3
A2— > w2 = - 5
A3—> W3 = .3
At the completion of step 1 the model purpose and
scenario have been defined; the evaluation criteria that
will be used in the empirical testing portion of the
validation process have been identified; and the relative
importance of each criterion has been established.
B. ESTABLISH FACE VALIDITY
Establishing Face Validity or the reasonableness of the
model is the second stage of the validation process. Those
knowledgeable about the real world system being modeled
review the model for realism. This is the stage of the
validation process where the opinion of experts as well as
the lessons of the past can be brought to bear to preclude
poor modeling.
The major checks for reasonableness include continuity
checks, consistency checks, and response to degenerate and
absurd conditions. [Ref.32, p. 929]
1. Continuity Checks: small changes in input parameters
should cause consequent small changes in output
variables unless large changes can be understood andjustified by the structure and process of the system
being modeled.
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2. Consistency Checks: runs of the same scenario should
produce similar results, changing the initial seed etc
should not produce dramatically different outcomes.
3. Degenerate Conditions: when certain aspects of the
model are removed the model output should reflect their
absence
.
4. Absurd Conditions: absurd conditions should not be
generated by the model, e.g. negative counts of things,
entities being in more than one place at a time.
The test for face validity has its greatest value early
in the modeling process. The model developer should have
taken efforts to ensure that checks for reasonableness were
accomplished throughout the model building process. In doing
this the modeler continually eliminates the more obvious
representation errors that the model may contain.
C. EMPIRICAL TESTING
Data from the NTC is used to support steps three and four
of the validation process: testing the model's hypotheses and
testing the model's predictive capability. These two steps
are combined because of their similarity of approach.
The empirical testing of the model involves comparing
data from the NTC to data from the model. To accomplish this
a portion of the NTC data is generally used to "drive" the
simulation. These data are used to ensure that the scenario
and other domain characteristics of the NTC and the model are
the same. The data required for this are most often that
data which reflect the unmodeled human decision processes and
that which represent weapon characteristics that are affected
by the NTC representation of reality.
The human decisions that most non-systemic high
resolution simulations require as input revolve around the
maneuver of forces on the battlefield. Thus, the
position/location data are often a part of the model
"driving" data set and are considered "historical data" of
the scenario in question. The second consideration is
prompted by the discrepancies that do exist between the MILES
representation of a weapon system and the weapon's actual
characteristics. The significant weakness of MILES is its
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inability to capture the true range of the longer ranged
weapons systems. This is overcome by using MILES weapon
range characteristics as inputs to the model rather than
those officially provided by the Army Material Command. This
substitution is acceptable for the validation process if one
condition is met. Prior to use of the MILES parameters, the
model must be subjected to a sensitivity analysis. This
analysis must produce reasonable results over a parameter
range that includes both the MILES value and the official
value of the parameter in question. This will provide
confidence that after successful validation resubstitution of
the official values of the parameters will still produce
realistic results.
The empirical testing takes place over the range of
criteria identified in step one of the validation process.
The setting is :
1
.
An identified set of evaluation criteria
2. A weighting scheme associated with the criteria set
3. NTC data available for two purposes
a. Provide adequate data to "drive" simulation
b. Provide adequate data to support comparative
evaluation of model data
4. A model producing sufficient data to conduct the test.
A comparison of the data from the simulation and from the NTC
will be the eventual test used in the validation process.
While validation is essentially a relative process, minimum
acceptance levels for each criteria should be established.
These bounds should be liberal, giving full consideration for
the reliability limitations in a testing process such as
this .
Setting the bounds for acceptance regions for most
statistical procedures translates into establishing the
bounds for acceptable probabilities of Type I and Type II
errors. Type I errors, rejecting a valid model, may be
considered as the model builder's risk , and Type II errors,
accepting am invalid model, may be considered as the model
user's risk [Ref.33, p. 186]. Generally, minimization of the
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Type II error for a specified level of Type I error is the
goal of the testing procedure. The probability of a Type I
error is referred to as the level of significance associated
with the test procedure. The establishment of the level of
significance is dependent on two factors:
1) The deviation of model data from NTC data that would be
expected if NTC were a perfect surrogate for reality,
and
2) The expected deviation of NTC data from reality based
on its imperfections as a surrogate.
While consideration of the first factor will generate
rather consistent initial values for the levels of
significance, the second factor will cause a divergence of
values for the various criteria. In the example under
consideration, tests for each of the criteria, A-'s, may have
the same initial standard for level of significance, say .01.
The second factor requires the consideration of the source of
data that supports each of the criteria under question.
Since the MILES gives less reliable and less accurate data
than the position\location system, using the same level of
significance to test both criteria would be inappropriate.
A model might be improperly rejected based on the additional
inaccuracies of the data base, even when it appropriately
represents reality. Thus the requirement for a particular
level of significance should be relaxed for criteria where
the NTC shows significant weakness in representing reality.
Relaxing requirements, when speaking of levels of
significance, means decreasing the value of the level of
significance. This effectively increases the acceptance
region of the test. The results of consideration of factor
two, for the example, are portrayed in Figure 13. By making
these adjustments, the different levels of combat
representation that the NTC provides have been accounted for
in the testing process.
The next step in this phase of the validation process is
to run the simulation and collect data that supports testing
of model hypotheses and model predictive capabilities. After
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LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE
initial (factor 1) Final (factor 2)
Criteria
Ai 10 01
A 2 10 10
A3 .10 05
Figure 13
this a comparison of data produced by the NTC and by the
model may be accomplished. The theory of statistics,
especially in terms of parameter estimation, hypothesis
testing and time series analysis provide the tools by which
these comparisons may be made. These comparisons result in
an acceptance or rejection decision for each of the criteria
in question.
The majority of the tests performed will be of the nature
of comparing central tendency measures of the identified
criteria. If a large enough sample size of both the NTC data
and the simulation data is available, then the Central Limit
Theorem may be invoked, and a two sample Z-test can be used
to compare the sample means of the data collected in support
of each criteria. Efforts should be made to ensure large
sample sizes because this provides the most straightforward
test of the criterion. If this is not possible, the two
sample t-test may be applied if the sample populations can
be shown to be normal or nearly normal, and the variances of
the NTC data and the simulation data can be shown to be
approximately the same. If these conditions cannot be
established, non-parametric tests may be needed, because of
the distribution-free requirements imposed by the data.
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If the model fails to pass any of the tests associated
with the evaluation criteria, the model should be rejected.
The criteria that caused the rejection should be reported to
the modeler for corrective action. Those models that pass
these tests form the feasible set, from which the
decisionmaker may choose a model to apply to the problem at
hand
.
When the feasible set of models within a particular
purpose domain have been established, there remains the
process of deciding which model to use. The analyst must
present to the decisionmaker the information necessary for
choosing a specific model in a succinct, yet meaningful
form. One method, certainly not the only method, which gives
the decisionmaker both flexibility and advice as to the
proper model choice involves P-values . The decisionmaker
would be provided two pieces of information for each
criterion tested. The first would be the weighting factor
initially established in step one. This provides the
decisionmaker a basic recommendation of the relative
importance of the criteria under question. The
decisionmaker, while not obligated to use these specific
weights in his decision process, will most probably use
these as a baseline upon which to apply refinements. These
refinements of the relative importance of each criteria will
be based on his personal perceptions of the problem under
consideration and account for minor changes in the problem
structure that occurred during the validation process. The
second piece of information is a vector of the P-values
associated with the criteria against which the each model was
evaluated. A vector of these values is provided for each of
the models in the feasible set. This provides the
decisionmaker with information on the margin of acceptance by
For those unfamiliar with the idea of P-values,
and the Sciences
a succinct
ption of their appl:
Probability and Statistics for Engineering
(HrOoks/UOle 1987) 57 Jay Uevore provides"
descri lication.
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which each model successfully met each requirement. This
allows differentiation between models that barely met certain
criteria and models that met the criteria by a wide margin.
Through this process of empirical testing the set of
candidate models is reduced to a set of feasible models. The
decision maker is then provided information to assist him in
making an appropriate selection from the feasible set. This
process is outlined in Figure 14.
D. SUMMARY
This process and its results have the potential to
benefit the Army in many ways . First it provides a method of
selecting a model between competing candidates. Second, it
will highlight the significant deficiencies of each model put
through the process. Finally, it provides an objective
alternative to the subjective methods of validation that are
predominant in the Army today.
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EMPIRICAL TESTING METHODOLOGY

















The National Training Center was found to be a source of
data that is highly representative of actual combat. Lack of
this kind of data has been a serious hindrance to attempts
to validate high resolution combat models. It is recommended
that a technical database, under the umbrella of the National
Training Center Research Database, be developed and
maintained to support efforts to validate combat models.
The methodology presented provides an approach to the issue
of validation that makes use of the data from NTC,
automatically updates validation criteria to account for
changes in weapons and tactics, and is responsive to the






















The tendency to use only easily available
information and ignore less available
sources of significant information. An
event is believed to occur with high
probability if it is easy to recall
similar events.
Failure to revise estimates as much as
they should be, based on receipt of new
significant information.
Tendency to reach premature conclusions
based on a small amount of data, ignoring
data received later.
Data which can be easily recalled or
assessed will affect perception of the
likelihood of that event. People
typically weigh easily remembered data
more than that not so easily remembered.
People often remember and attach higher
validity to information which confirms
their previously held beliefs than they do
to disconfirming information.
Strongly held values may often be regarded
and presented as facts. That type of
information is sought that lends
credibility to one values and views.
The tendency to associate success with
personal ability and failure with poor
luck
.
False assumption that an unexpected
occurrence of a "run" of one event
enhances the probability of another event
occurring
.
People are often unable to think
objectively if they receive information
that an event has occurred and they are
told to ignore this information. With
hindsight outcomes that have occurred seem
to have been inevitable.
17 This information has been selected from Andrew P.
Sage's article "Behavioral and Organizational Considerations
in the Design of Information Systems and Processes for
Planning and Decision Support. It only represents a limited





11 . Illusion of
Correlation
A good outcome in a chance situation may
well have resulted from a poor decision.
The individual may assume a feeling of
control over events that is not
reasonable
.
Mistaken belief that two events covary
when they do not
.









Lack of sensitivity to quality of
evidence. Tendency to put greater
confidence in predictions based on small
samples of data with nondisconf irming
evidence than in much larger samples with
minor disconf irming evidence. Sample size
and reliability often have little effect
on relative confidence.
The order in which information is
presented affects information retention in
memory
.
The more redundant the data, the more
confidence associated with it,, even if it
is the same data presented in different
ways .
The largest observed values of
observations are used without regressing
towards the mean to consider the effects
of noisy measurements . Tendency to ignore
uncertainties
.
The tendency to select from the
information ' available only that
information that conforms to already held
views
.
Often cues appear only by occurrence of a




MULTIPLE INTEGRATED LASER ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM
MILES simulates the fire of direct fire weapons systems
and is used for engagement simulation. It consists of a
receiver-transmitter combination which uses eye-safe Gallium
Arsenide lasers to simulate the fire of direct fire weapon
systems. The MILES transmitter is a coded beam laser
transmitter which is attached to the weapon whose fire it is
simulating. Within MILES, a complete hierarchy of weapons
from the M16 to the TOW missile is made available through
beam coding. By coding the beam, being able to measure its
intensity, and using logic circuits in the receiver, MILES is
able to enforce proper engagement techniques for particular
weapon systems and to provide realistic operating ranges and
hit/kill probabilities. The MILES transmitter is sound-
activated, sending its coded beam only when a blank from the
weapon is actually fired, thus forcing logistical play and
requiring weapons to be operational. If blanks are not
available for a particular weapon system Miles may be adapted
to fire without blanks. In this mode, the transmitter
employs a logic circuit which counts the number of rounds
expended and enforces a mandatory reload point for larger
systems such as the TOW or Dragon. When the basic load is
expended, the transmitter is disabled and requires resetting
before the weapon can fire again. Controllers reset the
transmitter once the requirements of resupply have been met.
The MILES receiver works with a group of laser detectors
that are attached at prominent places on individual soldiers
and vehicles. When the coded laser pulses are received from
1 Q
This description of the MILES is, with minor
modifications, from the excellent discussion given by Timothy
Reischl in Reference
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a transmitter, the received codes are analyzed by the
receiver. The arriving pulses are compared to a threshold
level. If the pulse strength exceeds the threshold, the
weapon is in range, and a single bit is registered in the
detection logic. Once a valid arrangement of bits is formed
corresponding to a code for a particular weapon, a decision
is made to determine "hit" or "near miss". To accomplish a
relative difference in the probability of "hit" to "near
miss", MILES uses two approaches. First the transmitter
emits a smaller number of "hit" messages than "near miss"
messages, giving a lower probability of hit than near miss.
Secondly, the transmitter operates at higher power when it
emits near miss messages, thus increasing the area over which
near misses will be recorded.
Once a "hit" is registered, the receiver, reading from
the codes on the beam, determines if the firing weapon can
kill the vehicle carrying the receiver. (This precludes the
"killing" of tanks with an M16.) If this is the case, it
determines the extent of damage to the vehicle. The receiver
then causes audio and visual signal to be sent of the
individual of crew to announce the hit or near miss. The
kill indications are a flashing strobe light for vehicles and
a distinctive, continuous beeping noise for personnel. When a
kill occurs, the "killed" weapon is disabled from further
use
.
Through these methods MILES provides an extremely
realistic simulation of weapon firing and the casualty
effects of weapons engagements.
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APPENDIX C
NTC TACTICAL DATABASE TABLES 19
Mission Identification Table
Purpose: To provide information to completely identify
and categorize each mission segment.
Data Elements
:
Mission start date and time





A (armored) or M (mechanized)
2. Player State Initialization Table
Purpose: To describe the participants at the
beginning of the mission segment. Includes
friendly, enemy and controllers.
Data Elements:
Player Identification (vehicle bumper #)
Logical Player Number
B (blue) , (opfor) , or W (white)
I (instrumented) or N (not instrumented)
Player Type Code
Next Higher Line Unit
T (tracked) or U (untracked)
Player Status Code
Player State Update Table
Purpose: To track changes to all participants throughout
the mission segment.
Data Elements:
Date and Time of Update
Player identification (vehicle bumper #)
Logical Player Number
B Tblue) , (opfor) , or W (white)
I (instrumented) or N (not instrumented)
Vehicle Type Code
Next Higher Line Unit
T (tracked) or U (untracked)
Player Status Code
1 Q
A separate INGRESS database consisting of this set of
tables is created for each mission
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Unit State Initialization Table
Purpose: To describe Opfor and Bluefor units at the




Next Higher Line Unit
Next Higher Statistical Unit
Unit Type Code
Force Code (R or B)
Echelon
Unit Type Table





Unit Force (R or ^)
Echelon Identifier
Unit Description
Unit State Update Table
Purpose: To track changes to all units throughout the
mission segment.
Data Elements
Date and Time of Update
Unit Name
Next Higher Statistical Unit
Unit Type Code
Player/ Vehicle/ Weapon Code Table
Purpose: To define a unique code for each weapon on the
battlefield. The codes are the same as the
MILES codes.
Data Elements:







Purpose: To maintain a time ordered record of all
legitimate firings recorded by the RDMS
.
Data Elements:




Position Location X Coordinate




Purpose: To maintain a time ordered record of legitimate
pairing events. Includes information on firer




Date and Time of Pairing
Target ID
Target LPN
N (near miss), H (hit), K (kill)
Firer Weapon Type (MILES)
Fratricide Indicator (Y/N)
Target Position Location X Coordinate
Target Position Location Y Coordinate
Firer Position Location X Coordinate
Firer Position Location Y Coordinate
10. Communication Table
Purpose: To maintain a record of all commo events.




Date and Time of Commo Event
Player ID
LPN
Radio Net (1 or 2)
Duration of Transmission (sec)
11. Ground Player Position Location Table
Purpose: To maintain a time-ordered record of Position
location for each instrumented ground




Date and Time of Position Location
Player ID
LPN
Position Location X Coordinate
Position Location Y Coordinate
12. Air Player Position Location Table
Purpose: To maintain a time-ordered record of Position
location for each instrumented air player. Can
be recorded at selected intervals.
Data Elements:
Date and Time of Position Location
Player Id
LPN
Position Location X Coordinate
Position Location Y Coordinate
Position Location Z Coordinate
13. Indirect Fire Casualty Assessment (IFCAS) Target Table
Purpose: To maintain a list of pre-planned indirect
fire targets and their locations.
Data Elements:
IFCAS Target Name
Side (R or B)
Target Index
Position Location X Coordinate
Position Location Y Coordinate
14. IFCAS Target Group Table
Purpose: To maintain a list of pre-planned IFCAS target
groups and their component targets.
Data Elements:
IFCAS target Group Name
Side (R or B)
IFCAS Target Name #1
IFCAS Target Name #2
(Up to 10 targets)
15. IFCAS Missions Fired Table
Purpose: To maintain a list of all IFCAS missions fired
during this mission segment.
Data Elements:
Date and Time of IFCAS Mission
IFCAS Preplanned Mission Number
Force Code (R or B)
Battery Identification
IFCAS Target Group Name
IFCAS Target X Coordinate
IFCAS Target Y Coordinate
IFCAS Weapon Type Code
Shell Type Code
Fuse Type Code
16. IFCAS Casualties Table
Purpose: To maintain a list of all casualties assessed
as a result of IFCAS missions fired during
mission segment.
Data Elements:
Date and Time of IFCAS mission
IFCAS Mission ID
Force Code (R or B)
ID of Player Killed by IFCAS
LPN of Player Killed by IFCAS
Target Position Location X Coordinate
Target Position Location Y Coordinate
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17 Minefield Casualties Table
Purpose: To maintain a list of all casualties assessed




Date and Time of Minefield Casualty
ID of Player Killed by Minefield
LPN of Player Killed by Minefield
Target Position Location X Coordinate
Target Position Location Y Coordinate
Control Measure Table
Purpose: To maintain a list of all control measures




















Type: l=Point, 2=Line, 3=Area
Purpose
Mine Type (if applicable)
Number of Points Used
X Coordinate, Point 1
Y Coordinate, Point 1
X Coordinate, Point 2
Y Coordinate, Point 2
(Up to 12 Points)
19. Control Measure Add Table
Purpose
:
To maintain a list of all control measures


























Type: l=Point, 2=Line, 3=Area
Purpose
Mine Type (if applicable)
Number of Points Used
X Coordinate, Point 1
Y Coordinate, Point 1
X Coordinate, Point 2
Y Coordinate, Point 2
(Up to 12 Points)
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